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Historical combat data analysis is a way of understanding the factors affecting 
battle outcomes.  Current studies mostly prefer simulations that are based on 
mathematical abstractions of battles.  However, these abstractions emphasize objective 
variables, such as force ratio.  Models have very limited abilities of modeling important 
intangible factors like morale, leadership, and luck.  Historical combat analysis provides 
a way to understand battles with the data taken from the actual battlefield.  The models 
built by using classification trees reveal that the objective variables alone cannot explain 
the outcome of battles.  Relative factors, such as leadership, have deep impacts on 
success.  This result suggests that combat simulations will have a difficult time predicting 
combat outcomes unless we can better account for these intangible factors.  Historical 
combat analysis helps us comprehend these factors.  The classification model predictions 
on test sets reveal correct classification rates as high as 79 percent.  Considering the 
variability in the data set this outcome is satisfying.  Classification models also reveal 
that the factors affecting outcome of battles have changed throughout history.  The 
leadership advantage played an important role for hundreds of years.  However, in the 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Predicting outcomes of battles has been a main concern of analysts throughout 
history.  Analysts have tried to answer many questions relating to principles of war such 
as rates of advance, attrition, force ratios, and battle termination rules.  These analyses 
were intended to give commanders a better understanding of battles, thus helping them 
make better decisions. 
While making decisions about battles, commanders need a solid basis for their 
decisions.  The chaotic and unpredictable nature of a war makes the decision process 
extremely difficult.  Given this, can we find trends, models and guidelines that explain 
some of the phenomena of war?  Are these consistent over time? 
Simulations are widely used to understand and to predict battles.  Simulations are 
built on mathematical models, like Lanchester equations and Stochastic Lanchester 
Models.  However, these models are only simplifications of combat.  Modeling intangible 
factors like fear, leadership, morale and surprise is complex and has proven difficult to 
do.   
Another way of understanding and predicting wars is to use historical combat 
data.  The data are collected from historical military archives and field reports.  The 
statistical exploration of the data reveals historical trends, quantifies the importance of 
different variables, and suggests models.  However, few historical data sets are available.  
In 1983, the U.S. Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) contracted the Historical Evaluation 
and Research Organization (HERO) to prepare a detailed historical combat data set of 
601 battles and engagements [Ref.5: p 1-1].  An updated version of the data set, namely 
the CDB90G, is the main data set used in this thesis. 
This data set was first analyzed by the U.S. Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) 
under the Combat History Analysis Study Effort, CHASE, which was initiated in 1984.  
Through this effort, they tried to find historically based quantitative results for use in 
“military operations research, concepts formulation, war gaming, and studies and 
analysis” [Ref.5: p 1-5].  The guiding elements of the effort, listed under the essential 
elements of analysis and answers are 
 xv
1. Can the factors associated with victory in battle be identified? 
2. What long-term trends can be detected in historical combat data? 
3. Can the historical influence of air support on the outcome of the battles be 
quantified? 
4. What can be said about the factors influencing the rates of advance in land 
combat? 
As to the relationship of factors to victory, a logistic regression analysis revealed 
that the advantage parameter (ADV) had the strongest relationship.  The probability of an 
attacker’s victory was related to a logistic function of (the defender’s) empirical 
advantage parameter (ADV).   
In another effort, 427 non-WWII battles were used for the logistic regression 
[Ref.6].  By using this model, the authors tried to predict the outcomes of the 62 wars 
fought between 1823 and 1979.  The best prediction for the combined data set was 72.5 
percent correct [Ref.6: p 4-3]. 
In another CAA study [Ref.7], McQuie calculated 28 ratios and rates from the 
data set.  The main purpose was to compare war game results with the data from 
historical battles.  He wanted to set some criteria and standards for war games.  McQuie 
pointed out that while future battles would not be replications of past ones, the most 
credible comparisons were with past battles. 
Faruk explored CAA’s revised version of the HERO database, the CDB90FT 
[Ref.3].  The data set consist of 660 battles and engagements with 140 different 
attributes.  Faruk analyzed the 3-1 force ratio rule of thumb, the dispersion rates and the 
daily casualty rate.  He divided the data into chronological subsets and analyzed each 
subset.  He concluded that the force ratio was a reasonable predictor of outcomes, even 
though it is probabilistic. 
In this research, we use the latest version of the data set, namely the CDB90G.  
The data set is detailed and contains many variables that cannot be used in classification 
purposes.  In this study, some variables are pre-selected from the data set and they are 
used to build classification trees.  Classification trees are more human readable and easier 
 xvi
to understand than the multiple logistic regression models.  They don’t need 
distributional assumptions, so transformations are not needed.  Classification trees have 
also some capabilities to include variables with missing values. 
The pre-selected variables are analyzed to show descriptive statistics, and 
conditional plots.  The pre-selected variables are 
1. Objective variables: force ratio, tank ratio, artillery ratio, cavalry ratio, the 
attacker’s primary tactical scheme, and the defender’s primary defensive posture.  
2. Relative variables: relative surprise, relative air superiority in the theater, relative 
combat effectiveness, relative leadership advantage, relative training advantage, 
relative morale advantage, relative logistics advantage, relative momentum 
advantage, relative intelligence advantage, relative technology advantage, relative 
initiative advantage.  
3. Terrain and weather variables: three terrain factors and five weather factors. 
The descriptive statistics and conditional plots reveal the importance of the 
variables in determining the outcome of battles.  The descriptive statistics reveal that the 
objective variables are not highly correlated with victory.  However, some of the relative 
variables, such as leadership, have a strong relationship with the battle outcome, see 
Figure 1. 
Using these variables, three models are considered. Model 1 uses only the 
objective variables in building classification trees.  The predictions made with this model 
produced high misclassification rates.  This result is parallel to the findings with 
descriptive statistics.  Objective variables alone are not sufficient to classify battle 
outcomes.  Model 2 uses both objective and relative variables.  The resulting 
classification models have relatively low misclassification rates. The best of these makes 
87 percent correct predictions (for subset 3, years 1920-1945).  This result may be close 
to the limit of what we can predict, when we consider the variability in the data set and 
the role of luck in battles.  Model 3 includes the terrain and weather variables, as well as 
the objective and relative variables.  However, the resulting classification trees did not 
 xvii
include the terrain and weather variables.  Moreover, the misclassification rates were no 
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Figure 1. The Effect of the Leadership Advantage on Battle Outcome 
When the defenders had a relative leadership advantage, they won 88 
percent of the time, an increase of 48 percent compared to the initial battle 
outcome distribution.  When the attackers had a relative leadership 
advantage, they won 92 percent of the time, an increase of 32 percent.  
When neither side had the advantage, the attacker won 58 percent of the 
time and the defender won 42 percent of the time, a two percent change.  
These results show that relative leadership advantage is highly correlated 
with the outcome of a battle.   
In another analysis to understand the historical trends in battles, multiple 
classification trees are built by using objective and relative variables with training test 
sizes of 125.  Each classification tree is built with a training set size of 125 and the battle 
after the 125 battles in the data set is predicted.  Then, another classification tree is built 
with the next 125 battles, with an overlap of 124 battles.  At the end, 658-125=533 
classification trees are built and 533 predictions are made.  This analysis revealed some 
important results.  First, the importance of variables has changed throughout history.  
Second, the misclassification rates show that past battles failed to predict the battles of 
 xviii
World War II, in which new tactics and weapons were introduced to fighters.  Figure 2 
shows the variables that appeared in the first split of the classification trees.  This figure 
reveals that the variables affecting the outcome of a battle have changed throughout 
history. 
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Figure 2. First Split Criteria of Classification Models 
The relative leadership advantage appeared as the first split criterion in the 
first battles of the data set.  The relative initiative advantage got 
importance in World War I.  In World War II and after, objective 
variables, such as tank and CAS sorties ratio got precedence over other 
variables.  The “index” shows the number of the classification tree in 
which the first split is taken.  The “year” shows the last year of the 125 
battles in the training set. 
 
However, the validity of these results is directly related to the validity of the data 
set.  Dr. Helmbold, who has supervised the CBD90G data set, pointed out that there may 
be some errors in the data set, and the models are affected by the diverse definitions and 
categories.  He also added that despite its shortcomings, this data set was far and away 



























I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Predicting outcomes of battles has been a main concern of military analysts 
throughout history.  Analysts have tried to answer many questions relating to principles 
of war such as rates of advance, attrition, force ratios, and battle termination rules.  
Helmbold [Ref.1] cites Vegetius 380 AD, whose work was published in 1944, as the first 
historian who worked on the rates of advance.  Moreover, Helmbold compared the works 
of 34 analysts who studied the rates of advance.  These analyses were intended to give 
commanders a better understanding of battles, thus helping them make better decisions.  
While making decisions about battles, commanders need a solid basis for their 
decisions.  The chaotic and unpredictable nature of a battle makes the decision process 
extremely difficult.  For this purpose, many rules of thumb have been proposed to 
understand and to forecast battles.  To name two [Ref.2: p. 5] “God is on the side of 
heavier battalions (Napoleon),” and “a successful attacker should be three times as strong 
as the opposing defender.”  For a long time, attackers used the 3 to 1 ratio to decide 
whether to attack.  However, Faruk’s analyses [Ref.3] shows that attackers won only 68 
percent of the time when they had a three to one or greater advantage.  In addition, 
Dupuy [Ref.2:p.5] contradicts some other “forecasting propositions from military 
history,” such as “the numerically inferior force is usually victorious.”  Given this, can 
we find trends, models and guidelines that explain some of the phenomena of war?  Are 
these consistent over time? 
Simulations are widely used to understand and to predict battles.  Simulations are 
built on mathematical models, like Lanchester equations and Stochastic Lanchester 
Models.  However, these models are only simplifications of combat.  Modeling intangible 
factors like fear, leadership, morale and surprise is complex.  Rowland [Ref.4: p 46] 
shows that the degradation can be nine-tenth in real combat.  In other words, a soldier’s 
achievement in real combat can be one-tenth of his or her success in a simulation or even 
in a training exercise. 
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Another way of understanding and predicting battles is to use historical combat 
data.  The data are collected from historical military archives and field reports.  The 
statistical exploration of the data reveals historical trends, quantifies the importance of 
different variables, and suggests models.  However, few historical data sets are available.  
In 1983, the U.S. Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) contracted the Historical Evaluation 
and Research Organization (HERO) to prepare a detailed historical combat data set of 
601 battles and engagements [Ref.5: p 1-1].  An analysis of the data set appeared in 
several papers [Ref.5, Ref.6, and Ref.7].  In addition, Dupuy [Ref.2] formed the 
Quantified Judgment Model by using historical combat data.  Faruk did an exploratory 
analysis on the revised version of the CAA’s database, called CDB90FT, which consists 
of 660 battles [Ref.3].  An updated version of the CDB90FT data set, namely the 
CDB90G, is the main data set used in this thesis. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Historical combat data sets are likely to contain errors and uncertainties in them.  
However, the CDB90G is regarded as the best available historical combat data.  This 
thesis does not address data errors.  
The literature about the analysis of the historical combat data is reviewed.  The 
papers relating to the CAA’s data set are a good source about the collection, sources, and 
veracity of the data set.  They also provide information about the battles, factors related 
to victory, and rates of advance.   
1. CHASE Study 
The U.S. Concepts Analysis Agency initiated the Combat History Analysis Study 
Effort in 1984.  Through this effort, they tried to find historically based quantitative 
results for use in “military operations research, concepts formulation, war gaming, and 
studies and analysis” [Ref.5: p 1-5].  The guiding elements of the effort, listed under the 
essential elements of analysis and answers are 
1. Can the factors associated with victory in battle be identified? 
2. What long-term trends can be detected in historical combat data? 
3. Can the historical influence of air support on the outcome of the battles be 
quantified? 
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4. What can be said about the factors influencing the rates of advance in land 
combat? 
The historical combat database has been analyzed for descriptive statistics, factors 
associated with victory, redundancy analysis, breakpoint analysis, rates of advance, air 
support and long-term trends.  Of the factors associated with victory, six variables were 
considered [Ref.5: p 4-1].  Force ratio (FR) 
1. Bitterness (EPS) 
2. Casualty Exchange Ratio (CER) 
3. Fractional Exchange Ratio (FER) 
4. Advantage (ADV) 
5. Residual Advantage (RESADV) 
Detailed definitions of these variables are provided at the Appendix I. 
A logistic regression analysis revealed that the advantage parameter had the 
strongest relationship with victory.  The probability of an attacker’s victory was related to 
a logistic function of (the defender’s) empirical advantage parameter (ADV).  The 
relationship between ADV and the battle outcome is given at Figure 3. 
With respect to the dependence of victory on ADV, post-1940 era battles differed 
significantly from pre-1940 era battles.  This was called the World War II anomaly.  A 
number of hypotheses to locate the source of this anomaly were tested and some new 
steps were suggested, such as omitting Italian and Okinawan campaigns and analyzing 
the logistic regression fit after the outliers are eliminated. 
Following the CAA work, our analysis will begin with exploring this relationship 
by using a classification tree. 
2. Relationship between Casualties and Victory 
In a following CAA study [Ref.6], similarities between battles and wars in 
accordance with casualties and victory were analyzed. 
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Figure 3. The Histogram of ADV  
Defenders won the majority of battles that had high ADV values. The 
overlap in two histograms will be the cause of misclassified outcomes. 
The relationship between victory and the defender’s empirical advantage was proposed 
as: 
P(ADV) = EXP ( a + b * ADV) / ( 1 + EXP ( a + b * ADV) )  (1) 
where P(ADV) is the probability that the attacker wins a battle in which the defender’s 
advantage relative to the attacker is ADV.  The parameter’s a and b are called the logistic 
regression intercept and slope.  The relationship between the probability of victory and 
the ADV is given in Figure 4. 
The (defender’s) empirical advantage parameter was calculated from the 
casualties and personnel strengths.  
ADV = (1/2) * LOG (FER)       (2) 
with 
 FER = FX / FY        (3) 
where FX and FY are the attacker’s and defender’s fractional losses. 
In the paper, “Do Battles and Wars Have a Common Relationship between 
Casualties and Victory,” [Ref.6], 427 non-WWII battles were used for the logistic 
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regression.  Figure 4 shows the probability of the attacker’s and the defender’s winning 
as a function of ADV.  The values obtained in the logistic regression are 
 Logistic regression intercept  = a = −0.02017 
 Logistic regression slope = b = −4.87764 
















ADV and Probability of Victory
PROB (DEFWIN)PROB (ATKWIN)
 
Figure 4. Probability of Battle Outcome for Non WW II Battles  
versus ADV. After [Ref.5: p 4-16] 
By using this model, the authors tried to predict the outcomes of the 62 wars 
fought between 1823 and 1979.  These wars were listed in another database called the 
“inter-state.”  This database was divided according to observations with high and low 
confidence levels with regard to the accuracy of the data.  For the high confidence level, 
the best prediction was 85 percent correct, for the low confidence level 64.7 percent 
correct, and for the combined data set 72.5 percent correct [Ref.6: p 4-3]. 
3. Benchmarks 
In another CAA study [Ref.7], McQuie calculated 28 ratios and rates from the 
historical combat database.  The main purpose was to compare war game results with the 
data from historical battles.  He wanted to set some criteria and standards for war games.  
If some of the criteria were violated, more runs would be needed to understand why that 
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happened in a war game.  He pointed out that while future battles would not be 
replications of past ones, the most credible comparisons were with past battles.  From the 
Army’s database of historical battles of 601 wars, he selected 260 battles since 1937.  
McQuie chose only the characteristics “that could have been obtained from a war 
correspondent at the scene of the conflict.” [Ref.7: p 4].  Some information about battles 
was lost, but military historians estimated that information after the battle.  The missing 
values in the data set were another concern.  These values could not be obtained because 
some historical records were destroyed or inaccessible.   
In addition, the reliability of the data was analyzed.  According to the military 
historians, the data from the Western European and Italian campaigns of WWII were the 
most reliable, whereas that from the Korean front was the least reliable.  The reliability of 
the information from the Middle East wars stood in the middle, with data on the 1956 and 
1973 wars being better than the data on the 1948 and 1967 wars. 
McQuie gave measures of variability in the data; see Table 1.  The variability is 
generally high because of the nature of combat.  For example, during the Sinai campaign, 
the Israeli army moved at a rate of 45km per day, while US troops moved 100m per day 
at one of the engagements in Okinawa. 
4. Faruk Yigit’s Thesis 
Yigit [Ref.3] explored CAA’s revised version of the HERO database, the 
CDB90FT.  The dataset consist of 660 battles and engagements with 140 different 
attributes.  Faruk analyzed the 3-1 force ratio rule of thumb, the dispersion rates and the 
daily casualty rate.  He divided the data into chronological subsets and analyzed each 
subset.  He concluded that the force ratio was a reasonable predictor of outcomes.  In 
that, for example, force ratio of 3 to 1 or greater lead to victory 68 percent of the time.  
Figure 5 shows the attacker’s and defender’s probability of winning as a function of the 
force ratio. 
C. TREATMENT OF THE DATA  
The main goal of this thesis will be classifying battle outcomes according to the 
response variable, WINA, which shows who wins (1 attacker wins, 0 draw, −1 defender 
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wins).  Two battles in the data had an unknown outcome, so they were discarded.  In 
addition, 6.5 percent of the battles resulted in draws.  Following the CAA analysis [Ref.5: 
p 4-13] and [Ref.6: p 2-2], the draws were recorded as wins on the defenders’ side.  By 
regrouping into two categories, the response variable became binominal.  The resulting 













  Force Ratio Men High : 1967 Egypt: Israel   17:1 
  (atkr:dfdr) Low : 1945 Japan:USA  0.3:1 
  57:1 
  Force Ratio Artillery High : 1945 USA:Japan   50:1 
  (atkr:dfdr) Low : 1948 Israel:Syria 0.11:1 
 450:1 
  Mortar Density dfdr High : 1943 Britain:Germany 132 
  (wpns/km) Low : 1973 Egypt:Israel 0.19 
 730:1 
  Artillery Density atkr High : 1944 USA:Japan 444 
  (wpns/km) Low : 1948 Israel:Jordan 0.2 
2200:1 
  Casualty Rate atkr High : 1945 USA:Japan 96% 
  (% per day) Low : 1944 Britain:Germany 0.13% 
 740:1 
  Tank Loss Rate atkr High : 1967 Israel:Syria 92% 
  (% per day) Low : 1944 USA:Germany 0.63% 
 150:1 
  Advance Rate High : 1967 Israel:Egypt 45 
  (km per day) Low : 1945 USA:Japan 0.1 
 450:1 
Table 1. Variability of Characteristics from [Ref.7: p.13] 
All the Ratios Vary Considerably. 
In the data set, the column names are recorded in capital letters.  In order to 
differentiate the original columns and our calculations, such as the force ratio, 









































Figure 5. P (Attacker wins) and P (Defender wins)  
Values as a Function of Force Ratio from [Ref.3: p. 67] 
The missing values in the data set will be handled by a special classification tree 
library, rpart (recursive partitioning), in S-PLUS [Ref.8 and Ref.10].  During the 
recursive partitioning, an alternative split (surrogate) is selected for the missing values. 
The procedure is best described in [Ref.8: p. 318] as: 
…The surrogates, alternative splits, are used to handle missing 
cases both in training and in prediction (including cross-validation to 
choose complexity).  Each of the surrogate splits is examined in turn, and 
if the variable is available, that split is used to decide whether to send the 
case to the left or right.  If no surrogate is available or none can be used, 
the case is sent to the majority…. 
…  
When missing values are encountered in considering a split they 
are ignored and the probabilities and impurity measured are calculated 
from the non-missing values of that variable.  Surrogate splits are then 
used to allocate the missing cases to the daughter nodes. 
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This method of handling missing values is important to our data.  In the data, 
every row has one or more missing values.  Other classification models omit rows with 
missing values, so they allow the user to include only those columns that have less 
missing values in the model.  However, with the rpart library we can use all related 
columns in the data set to build our model and to make predictions. In this way, we are 
using as much data as possible.  
The data are divided into five subsets; see Table 2.  We know that weapons and 
tactics have changed tremendously during history.  The weapons of the 1600’s cannot be 
compared to the weapons of World War II.  Looking for trends that have proved invariant 
over time, we divided the data set into subsets.  The five subsets were selected so as to 
have an approximately equal number of battles in each.  
Each subset will be divided into two parts.  The first two-thirds of the subset will 
be the “training set.”  The tree models will be built by using the training set.  The last 
one-third will be the “test set.”  This test set will be used in prediction and cross-
validation.  The predictions will help us answer the question, “Can we predict the 
outcomes of future battles?” 
 
SUBSET NO SUBSET SIZE TRAINING SET SIZE TEST SET  SIZE 
1 1600 -1847 164 1600 - 1799 109 1799 - 1847 55 
2 1805 - 1918 260 1805 - 1915 178 1916 - 1918 82 
3 1920 - 1945 202 1920 - 1944 131 1944 - 1945 71 
4 1940 - 1982 223 1940 - 1948 150 1950 - 1982 73 
5 1600 - 1982 658 1600 - 1944 435 1940 - 1982 223 
Table 2. The Division of Data into Subsets 
The first subset consists of battles before 1847.  The training set will be the battles 
before 1799.  Using the model built from the training set, we will predict the outcomes of 
battles between 1799 and 1847.  The second subset consists of battles between 1805 and 
1918.  The outcomes of later battles of WWI will be predicted by the model built from 
the battles after 1805 and WWI battles through 1915.  The third subset consists of battles 
between 1920 and 1945.  There are nine battles between 1920 and 1939, so this subset is 
mainly from World War II.  The battles of 1944 and 1945 are predicted from the model 
trained by the early World War II battles.  The fourth subset consists of battles between 
1940 and 1982.  The outcomes of battles from the Arab-Israeli wars are predicted using 
the model of late World War II battles.  The fifth subset is the entire data set.  The 
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training set is made up by the wars before 1940.  The wars after 1943 will be the test set.  
This subset will reveal historical trends. 
D. TREE-BASED MODELS 
One efficient way of classifying the outcome of the battle is using classification 
trees [Ref.9].  Classification trees are more human-readable and easier to understand than 
multiple logistic regression models.  Trees simply show the structure in the data.  In 
addition, the output can be coded as a rule set and this can be implemented in other 
software, like Visual Basic, Java or C.  For example, the output of a tree can be put into 
pseudo code as [Ref.9]: 
if (force ratio>2) and (SURPA=A) 
then WINA is most likely to be in level 1(Attacker wins) 
Trees do not need distributional assumptions, so transformations are not needed.  
Any interactions between variables are automatically included in the tree structure.  
Trees are arranged hierarchically.  Until a terminal node is reached, the data 
flowing down the tree encounters one decision at a time.  Special cases can be used 
without affecting other decisions. 
The tree is constructed in an iterative process using the rpart package [Ref. 10] 
in the S-Plus data analysis system [Ref. 11]. All the observations start in a single group or 
"node." Then every possible unique split of the form “x < x0” (for a continuous x) or “x ∈ 
subset i” (for a categorical x) is examined. The split that reduces the multinomial log 
likelihood the most is chosen. This split separates the data into two pieces. Then each of 
those pieces in turn is split, and so on, until no more splitting is sensible or possible. 
The tree model formed in this way is generally “over-fit,” that is, too tightly 
bound to the peculiarities of the training set. In order for the model to generalize well to 
future data, the tree is “pruned” using cross-validation. In this process sub-trees of 
different sizes are constructed with 90% of the data set and their misclassification rates 
on the remaining 10% are computed. This is done ten times with each item in the data 
held out one time. Then, the misclassification rates are aggregated over the replications. 
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The “optimal” tree size is the one whose aggregated misclassification rate is smallest. 
Finally, the tree we choose for prediction follows the “one SE” rule of [Ref. 8], in which 
we choose the smallest tree whose cross-validated error rate is no larger than one 
standard error above the optimal one. Occasionally the one SE rule chooses a one-node 
tree; in these cases we have chosen the entire tree. 
Classification trees have special advantages over other classification methods 
[Ref.9: p.378]: 
1. In certain applications, especially where the set of predictors contains 
a mix of numeric variables and factors, tree-based models are 
sometimes easier to interpret and to discuss than linear models.  
2. Tree based models are invariant to monotone re-expressions of 
predictor variables, so the precise form in which these appear in a 
model formula is irrelevant. 
3. The treatment of missing values (NA) is more satisfactory for tree-
based models than for linear models.  
4. Tree-based models are more adept at capturing nonadditive behavior; 
the standard linear model does not allow interactions between 
variables unless they are pre-specified and of a particular 
multiplicative form. 
Graphs of classification trees are easy to understand.  The oval and rectangular 
boxes represent non-terminated nodes and terminal nodes respectively. The levels inside 
the boxes show the majority level of that node.  The boxes also contain the number of 
battles the defender won and the number of battles the attacker won in that node.  For 
example, in the root node of Figure 6, the majority level is “1”, "attacker wins;" the 
attacker won 71 battles and the defender won 38.  A split criterion is written on the 
branches.  If the criterion is satisfied, the observation is sent into the following node on 
that branch. For instance, 
if cavalry ratio, “cav,” is less than 1.060 and  
if force ratio, “fR,” is less than 0.848 and  
if the attacker’s primary tactics, “PRIA,” is frontal assault, “FF,” and 
if force ratio, “fR,” is greater than 0.704  
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then the battle is classified as “1”, attacker wins.   
There are 11 battles that satisfy all the criteria in the training set.  Of these battles 
the defender won four battles and the attacker won seven battles.  The attacker won more 
than the defender, so this leaf is assigned as the attacker wins. 
 
Figure 6. A Sample Classification Tree  
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E. REVISITING THE CAA STUDY 
In the first analyses of the data set by CAA [Ref.5], a simple relation between the 
probability of winning and the defender’s empirical advantage parameter (ADV) was 
found.  The relation is formulated in Equation 1 and Equation 2.  However, CAA used 
the ADV to show the relationship between casualties and victory.  Neither the ADV nor 
the force exchange ratio can be used as predictor variables of battles because each is a 
function of battle casualties, and casualties are known only after the battle.  Our analysis 
will begin by exploring the relationship between victory and force exchange ratio, but our 
main concern will be building models by using variables that can be known before a 
battle. 
Since classification trees do not require transformation of the variables, the 
relationship between winning and the force exchange ratio (FER) can be modeled in 
natural units, i.e. no logarithmic transformations are needed.  
In order to understand the relationship between the battle outcome and the force 
exchange ratio, the following tree, Figure 7, is built by using the entire data set and cross-
validating within the data set.  This model correctly explains 78 percent of the battle 
outcomes in the entire data set of 658 battles.  This model fits the data set, so in order to 
show whether this trend changed over history, we need to build models in training sets 
composed of earlier battles and to predict on the test sets that are composed of later 
battles. 
The results of splitting the data into five subsets are summarized in Table 3.  The 
test sets consisted of about one third of the data. 
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Figure 7. The Classification Tree Model  
On the leaves, “1” indicates that the outcome favored the attacker and 






ERROR RATE OF 
PREDICTIONS ON 
THE TEST SET 
 SUBSET 1 0.14 0.09 
 SUBSET 2 0.20 0.28 
 SUBSET 3 0.12 0.22 
 SUBSET 4 0.26 0.20 
 SUBSET 5 0.21 0.28 
Table 3. Error Rates of Models 
The models build by using the training sets can correctly predict battles in 
the test sets more than 72 percent of the time by using only one factor 
(fer). 
F. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1) Can we build classification trees to classify the outcomes of battles?  
2) What factors contribute to winning? 
3) Do these factors change over time? 
4) What are the effects of the tactics of the defender and the attacker? 
5) What are the effects of weapon systems? 
6) Is surprise an important factor in winning? 
G. SCOPE OF THE THESIS  
Descriptive statistics about factors such as weather, terrain, tactics, and force 
ratios will be calculated from CDB90G data by using the S-PLUS software. Furthermore, 
classification models will be built and used for predictions. Thus, the thesis will consist 
of: 
1) Literature review about historical combat data analysis; 
2) Summary statistics and plots; 
3) Building classification models to predict the outcome of the battles;  
4) Predicting new data from another data set or within the CDB90G dataset; 
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II. SUMMARY STATISTICS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
 
In your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military 
conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:  
(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? 
(2) Which of the two generals has most ability? 
(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? 
(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? 
(5) Which army is stronger? 
(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? 
(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and 
punishment? 
By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or 
defeat.  
–  Sun-Tzu, The Art of War 
 
  
In this chapter, the CDB90G data set will be analyzed.  The data set has many 
variables that cannot be used for predicting battle outcomes, such as degree of influence 
of relative factors (14 variables).  Some variables have too many levels to be useful, like 
battle location, commanders’ names, and campaign.  The data set contains a great number 
of variables that show the dates and times of the attack’s start and end (79 variables) and 
of times that defensive fronts become effective (15 variables).  To find the variables that 
relate to winning, we first made a pre-selection of the variables.  The pre-selection was 
done according to the author’s military judgment.  The pre-selected variables are divided 
into two groups, objective and relative variables.  
Objective variables are those that can be collected from the battleground.  These 
variables can be known before the battle occurs and almost everyone can agree on their 
value, at least within some tolerance.  These variables are the most important to our 
models.  Our data set gives total strengths, number of cavalry, artillery tubes, tanks, and 
air sorties for both the attacker’s and defender’s side.  Local terrain and weather 
conditions, posture of the defender, and tactics of the attacker are also included in the 
data set. 
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Relative variables, such as surprise, combat effectiveness, leadership advantage, 
and so on, are based on the judgment of military historians.  The preliminary analysis 
showed that objective variables alone fail to describe the outcome of most battles.  In 
order to build a model that can be used to understand and to predict battles, relative 
values need to be included. 
In the data set, some relative variables (relative combat effectiveness, leadership, 
training, morale, logistics, momentum, intelligence, technology, and initiative) are given 
with levels ranging from “–4” to “+4.”  A level of “–4” shows that the variable very 
strongly favors the defender, while “+4” shows that the variable very strongly favors the 
attacker.  The other levels come between, and level “0” favors neither side.  Another 
relative variable, surprise, is given in a scale ranging from “–2” to “+2.”  Negative levels 
show the defender’s surprise and positive ones show the attacker’s surprise.  Before the 
battle, knowing the relative advantage on this scale is difficult.  However, we may know 
which side has the advantage before the engagement.  Thus, the relative variables have 
been modified to show only which side, if any, had the advantage, without showing the 
relative levels.  
Weapons effects are expressed as ratios.  In some battles, the attackers had no 
weapons of a particular type.  This made the ratio zero, which gives no information about 
the number of the defender’s weapons.  In some other cases, the defender had no 
weapons and that makes the ratio infinity.  Adding a constant to both sides avoids these 
two pitfalls.  Therefore, in finding ratios, one is added to each side’s strength.  When 
neither side had that weapon, a missing value indicator is assigned to the ratio variable. 
B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics help us understand the properties of the variables.  Box plots 
and histograms give a graphical picture of the distribution, median and outliers.  The 
descriptive statistics of the response variable and pre-selected variables that can affect the 
outcome of war follow. 
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1. Response Variable 
a) Battle Outcome: “WINA” 
Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat 
the enemy means taking the offensive. 
– Sun-Tzu, The Art of War 
This variable shows the outcome of a battle as a win for the attacker, a win for the 
defender or a draw.  In our classification model, “WINA” will be the response variable.  










Size 2 217 43 398 
Table 4. The Distribution of the Battle Outcome Variable, “WINA” 
The two battles with unknown battle outcome values will be discarded 
from the data set.  In the remaining set, 43 observations (7 percent of the data) are draws.  
Following the CAA’s approach, in order to make the response variable Bernoulli, draws 








Size 260 398 
Table 5. The Revised Distribution of the Response  
Variable, “WINA”  
In this table, 60 percent of outcomes favor the attacker, 40 
percent favor the defender.  The attacker had a higher chance of 
winning the battle.  This, by itself, suggests that our doctrine 
should seek offense as a primary course of action (COA).   
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2.  Objective Variables 
a) Force Ratio (Manpower Ratio): “fR” 
 
The superiority in numbers is the most important factor in the 
result of a combat, only it must be sufficiently great to be a counterpoise 
to all the other co-operating circumstances. The direct result of this is, that 
the greatest possible number of troops should be brought into action at the 
decisive point. 
– Clausewitz, On War 
 
 
Force ratio has been considered an important predictor of battle outcome 
throughout history [Ref.2].  However, the conditional plots of force ratios when the 
attacker won and when it lost look similar. The median force ratio when the attacker won 
the battle is 1.6.  The median when the defender won the battle is 1.3.  When the attacker 
had a force ratio greater than 1.6, it won 65 percent of the time.  When the attacker had a 
force ratio of 1.3 or less, the attacker won 55 percent of the time. The spread of force 
ratio is given in Figure 8. 
In order to see whether medians of two conditional samples of force ratio 
(force ratio when the attacker wins and when it loses) are the same (in other words, the 
difference may be explained by chance), Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test will be used.  
Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test is like a two-sample t test; however, Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test 
does not assume the sample comes from a parametric family, e.g., a normal population 
[Ref.14].  The assumptions of the Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test are that two samples are 
randomly and independently chosen from continuous distributions, and they have 
medians µ1 and µ2 respectively [Ref.14: p.659]. The samples are assumed to have the 
same shape and the same spread.  The only difference between them is, possibly, their 
medians.  Note: Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test is robust to these assumptions. 
Our hypothesis is that the medians of two samples are equal.  This 
hypothesis will be tested against the alternative hypothesis that the median of force ratio 




The Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test reveals a p-value of 0.0019.  “The P-value 
is the probability, calculated assuming H0 is true, of obtaining a test statistic value 
as least as contradictory to H0 as the value that actually resulted” [Ref.14: p.342].  
At the five-percent significance level, the null hypothesis is rejected.  The median 
of the force ratio when the attacker wins is greater than the median of the force 
ratio when the defender wins. 







Seven Year's War 1757
 
Figure 8. The Spread of Force Ratio, “fR” 
The attacker had a slightly better chance of winning when it had higher 
force ratio values.  However, the defender won the battle 31 percent of the 
time when the attacker had a force ratio advantage of more than three to 
one. In one battle, when the Bengali army attacked the British army in 
1757, the attacker lost despite a force ratio advantage of more than sixteen 
to one. 
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Figure 9. The Conditional Histogram of Force Ratio, “fR” 
The two histograms look similar.  However, the attacker’s histogram has a 
longer tail than the defender’s.  
 













Figure 10. The Truncated Conditional Histogram of  
Force Ratio, “fR” 
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A truncated conditional histogram reveals the same result.  The effect of 
the force ratio on the battle outcome is not very significant.  We do not 
expect the force ratio variable to appear as an important variable in most 
of the classification models.  
 
b) Artillery Ratio “arty” 
Artillery is the only weapon in the data set that has been used from the 
first battles to the last ones.  Artillery played a particularly important role during the 
Napoleonic campaigns.  The median of artillery ratio where the attacker won the battle is 
1.5 and where the attacker lost is 1.26.  Conditional plots reveal that artillery cannot be 
the only predictor of battle outcomes.  The spread of the artillery ratio is given in Figure 
11.  The conditional histogram of the artillery ratio is given in Figure 12. 
The Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test is used to see whether the median of 




The Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test reveals a p-value of 0.0292.  At the five-
percent significance level, the null hypothesis is rejected.  The median of the artillery 












Figure 11. The Spread of Artillery Ratio, “arty” 
The median and interquartile ranges of both box plots are close to each 
other.  Huge outliers are present in both box plots.  The defender won 28 



















Figure 12. The Conditional Histogram of Artillery Ratio, “arty” 
The two conditional histograms look similar. The attacker’s histogram is 
slightly to the right and the defender’s histogram is slightly to the left.  
These graphs show that there must be factors other than artillery ratio that 
relate to the outcome of battles. 
 
c) Close Air Support Ratio “fly” 
Air power was widely used in World War II and has been used since.  A 
main goal in today’s battles is to gain air superiority in the theater and launch the 
maximum number of air sorties.  In the Gulf War and the Kosovo War, air power was the 
decisive factor. 
The median of the close air support (CAS) sorties ratio in which the 
attacker won the battle is 14.27.  The median of air sorties ratio in which the attacker lost 
the battle is 2.12.  The difference in the medians is noticeable.  The attacker won 73 
percent of the battles when it had a CAS sorties ratio of 14.27 or greater.  The defender 
won 52 percent of the battles when the attacker had a CAS sortie ratio of 2.12 or less.  
This result shows that a higher CAS sorties ratio gives the attacker a better chance and a 
low ratio gives the defender a better chance to win the battle. 
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The Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test is used to see whether the median of CAS 
sorties ratio when the attacker wins is the same as the median of CAS sorties ratio when 
the defender wins. 
H0: µ1−µ2=0 
Ha: µ1−µ2>0 
The Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test reveals a p-value of 0.0003.  At the five-
percent significance level, the null hypothesis is rejected.  The median of CAS 
sorties ratio when the attacker wins is greater than the median of CAS sorties ratio 
when the defender wins. 








Figure 13. The Spread of CAS Sorties Ratio, “fly” 
The box plots of CAS sorties ratio in which the attacker won reveals a 
larger interquartile range than the other box plot in which the attacker lost 
the battle.  When the attacker had a higher CAS sorties ratio value, it had a 
higher chance of winning the battle.  In addition, outliers as large as 800 
are present in the air sorties ratio.  Outliers show the need to use robust 
classification techniques, such as classification trees. 
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Figure 14. The Truncated Conditional Histogram of  
CAS Sorties Ratio, “fly” 
The attacker had a greater chance of winning the war when the CAS 
sorties ratio value was large, and a higher change of losing the battle when 
the ratio was small.  The defender won 27 percent of the time when the 
attacker had a CAS sorties ratio of three to one or less. 
 
d) Tank Ratio “tank” 
In the data set, tanks (light tanks and main battle tanks) were present from 
1906 to 1982.  The median of the tank ratio when the attacker won the battle is 3.7.  For 
battles won by the defender, the median is 2.06.  The attacker won 77 percent of the 
battles when it had a tank ratio advantage of 3.7 or greater.  The defender won 42 percent 
of the battles when the tank ratio was less than 2.06.  The spread of the tank ratio is given 
in Figure 15. 
The Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test is used to see whether the median of tank 





The Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test reveals a p-value of 0.0092.  At the five-
percent significance level, the null hypothesis is rejected.  The median of tank 
ratio when the attacker wins is greater than the median of tank ratio when the 
defender wins. 
 








Figure 15. The Spread of the Tank Ratio, “tank” 
The interquartile range of the first box plot is larger than the second, 
showing that the attacker had a higher chance of winning the battle when 
it had a higher tank ratio.  However, in some battles the attacker had a 
ratio of more than 100 to 1 and still lost.  Outliers in the figure reveal the 
need for robust classification techniques, like the classification trees. 
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Figure 16. The Truncated Conditional Histogram of Tank Ratio 
The attacker had a higher chance of winning the battle when it had higher 
tank ratios.  The defender won 26 percent of the time when the attacker 
had a 3/1 or greater tank ratio. We would expect the tank ratio to be 
present in the classification models. 
 
e) Cavalry Ratio “cav” 
In the data set, the cavalry ratio variable is present in battles from 1600 to 
1905.  The spread of the cavalry ratio is given in Figure 17.  The median of the cavalry 
ratio when the attacker won the battle is 1.  The median of the cavalry ratio when the 
defender won the battle is 1.2.  The second median is greater than the first one, meaning 
that the defender won more battles that had a high cavalry ratio favoring the attacker.  
The conditional histogram of the cavalry ratio is given in Figure 17. 
The Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test is used to see whether the median of 





The Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test reveals a p-value of 0.947.  At the five-
percent significance level, the null hypothesis is not rejected.  The median of the 
cavalry ratio when the attacker wins is not greater than the cavalry ratio when the 
defender wins. 








Figure 17. The Spread of the Cavalry Ratio, “cav” 
In one battle, the attacker had a cavalry ratio of 15,000 to one and lost.  In 
another, the attacker had a cavalry ratio of 5,000 to one and lost that as 
well.  The defender won 55 percent of the battles when the attacker had a 
cavalry ratio of three to one or greater. These examples show that the 
cavalry ratio cannot be the sole predictor of a battle outcome.   
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Figure 18. The Spread of the Cavalry Ratio Without Large Outliers 
The interquartile range for the box plot in which the attacker wins is 
smaller than the box plot in which the defender wins.  The defender had a 
higher chance of winning when the attacker had a higher cavalry ratio.  

















Figure 19. The Truncated Conditional Histogram of the Cavalry Ratio, “cav” 
In the right tail, the defender had a higher chance of winning.  In the left 
tail, the attacker had a higher chance.  The conditional histograms reveal 
the same result as the box plots. We do not expect cavalry ratio to be 
included in most of the models. 
 
f) Defender’s Primary Defensive Posture: “POST1” 


















-1 4 72 129 55 0 
  1 16 107 164 107 2 
TOTALS 20 179 293 162 2 
Table 6. The Defender’s Primary Posture 
The defender used “hasty defense” 45 percent, “fortified defense” 27 
percent, and “prepared defense” 25 percent of the time.  Moreover, the 
defender won 49 percent of the time when it made a “hasty defense,” and 
this is the defender’s highest success rate between other defensive 
postures.  These results suggest that the defender should be prepared to 
fight without enough time for fortifications and preparations. 
 
g) Attacker’s Primary Tactical Scheme: “PRIA1” 
How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own 
tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend. 
– Sun Tzu, The Art of War 



















−1 5 0 11 238 5 
  1 14 1 30 324 22 
Size 19 1 41 562 27 
Table 7. The Attacker’s Primary Tactics 
Attackers used frontal attack 87 percent of the time.  In World War II, 
“frontal attack” was used 81 percent of the time.  “Frontal attack” is the 
least desirable offensive tactic because of the high casualty risk.  
However, it has been the most commonly used tactic throughout history.  
The other maneuvers are harder to plan and execute. 
The attacker’s chance of winning a battle given the defender’s posture and 


















Defensive Plan 0/0 0/0 
1/1 





























Table 8. The Attacker’s Chances of Victory Given the Attacker’s Tactics  
and the Defender’s Posture 
The numbers in the cells show the number of the attacker’s victory, the total 
number of battles and the probability of the attacker’s victory.  Most of the 
time (39 percent), the attacker used a frontal attack against the defender’s 
hasty defense, and the attacker was successful 53 percent of the time.  A 
frontal attack against a hasty defense was less successful than a frontal attack 
on a prepared defense and a fortified defense.  This may happen when the 
attacker was pursuing the defender and was not well prepared for a frontal 
attack.  Against a hasty defense, single envelopment and double envelopment 
tactics reveal much higher chances of victory.  According to the defender’s 
point of view, a flexible defense in a sector with a number of hasty defenses 
may be a better option than defending in a fortified defense against a well-
prepared attack.  
 
3. Relative Variables 
a) Relative Surprise: “SURPA” 
Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is 
unprepared. 
– FM 100-5 Operations 
 
Surprise is considered one of the principles of war [Ref.13]. As stated in 
the introduction to this chapter, the “SURPA” variable has been adjusted to show only 
which side achieved surprise, not the level of it. The distribution of the adjusted 
“SURPA” variable is given in Table 9. 
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The defender achieved surprise only two percent of the time.  The attacker 
achieved surprise 25 percent of the time.  In other words, the attacker could not achieve 
surprise 75 percent of the time.  This result shows that it is hard to achieve surprise even 
when an attacker plans to do so.  The effect of surprise on the battle outcome is given in 
Figure 20. 
SURPA
WINA A D O 
–1 32 14 206 
1 124 0 249 
TOTALS 156 14 455 
Table 9. The Distribution of the Surprise  
Variable, “SURPA” 
Attackers achieved surprise 25 percent of the time and the defenders 
achieved surprise two percent.  The attacker’s low chance of achieving 
surprise shows that achieving surprise is not an easy task to accomplish.  
The defender’s percentage shows that even the defenders can achieve 

































Figure 20. The Effect of Surprise on the Battle Outcome 
When they achieved surprise, attackers won 80 percent of the time and 
defenders won 100 percent of the time.  In general, surprise is related to 
offensive maneuvers.  The defender’s relative surprise means a failure on 
the attacker’s side.  This might be the reason for the defender’s high 
chance of winning the battle when it achieved surprise.  Compared to the 
initial distribution of the battle outcomes, achieving surprise increased the 
attacker’s and the defender’s chance of winning the battle by 20 percent 
and 60 percent respectively.  We would expect this variable to be present 
in our classification models. 
 
b) Relative Air Superiority in the Theater: “AEROA” 
Control of air gives commanders the freedom to conduct 
successful attacks that can neutralize or destroy an enemy’s war fighting 
potential. 
– FM 100-5 Operations  
Air power has been widely used since World War II.  The distribution of 
AERO is given in Table 10. 
 36
AEROA
WINA A D O 
–1 67 38 147 
1 162 19 192 
TOTALS 229 57 339 
Table 10. The Distribution of the Relative Air Superiority  
Variable, “AEROA” 
Of the battles in which one side had air superiority, attackers had air 
superiority 80 percent of the time and defenders had air superiority 20 
percent of the time.   


























Figure 21. The Effect of Relative Air Superiority on Battle Outcome 
When they had air superiority, the attackers won 71 percent of the time 
and the defenders won 67 percent of the time.  The air superiority’s effect 
on the battle outcome is more significant for the defender’s side.  
Compared to the initial distribution of the battle outcomes, the defender’s 




c) Relative Combat Effectiveness: “CEA” 
The distribution of relative combat effectiveness is given in Table 11.  The 
effect of relative combat effectiveness on the battle outcome is given in Figure 22. 
CEA
WINA 
A D O 
–1 22 55 175 
  1 120 27 226 
TOTALS 142 82 401 
Table 11. The Distribution of Relative Combat  
Effectiveness Variable, “CEA” 
The attacker had a relative combat effectiveness advantage 23 percent of 




























Figure 22. The Effect of Relative Combat Effectiveness on Battle Outcome 
When they had a relative combat effectiveness advantage, the attackers 
won 89 percent of the time and the defenders won 59 percent of the time.  
Having a relative combat effectiveness advantage increased the attacker’s 
chance of winning by 29 percent compared to the initial distribution of 
battle outcomes.  
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d) Relative Leadership Advantage: “LEADA” 
The most essential dynamic of combat power is competent and 
confident officer and noncommissioned officer leadership  
-FM 100-5 Operations 
 
Relative leadership advantage is an important factor in a battle. The 
distribution of relative leadership advantage is given in Table 12.  The effect of relative 




A D O 
–1 13 88 151 
1 155 12 206 
TOTALS 168 100 357 
Table 12. The Distribution of the Relative Leadership  
Advantage Variable, “LEADA” 
Attackers had the leadership advantage 27 percent of the time; 16 percent 
of the time the defenders did.  In the thirteen battles in which the attacker 
lost despite having the leadership advantage, the defender usually 
outnumbered the attacker. There are two exceptions, one in the 1900 Boer 
War, and other in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, but the outcomes of these 
battles are not clear-cut.  In the twelve battles in which the defender lost 
despite having a leadership advantage, the attacker usually outnumbered 
the defender. There is only one exception, a 1918 World War I battle, but 






























Figure 23. The Effect of the Leadership Advantage on Battle Outcome 
When they had a relative leadership advantage, the attackers won 92 
percent of the time and the defenders won 88 percent of the time.  The 
attacker’s chance of winning the battle increased by 32 percent compared 
to the initial battle outcome distribution.  The defender’s chance of 
winning the battle increased by 48 percent.  Both of these results show that 
relative leadership advantage plays an important role in determining the 
outcome of a battle.  This variable is expected to appear in the 
classification models. 
 
e) Relative Training Advantage: “TRNGA” 
The distribution of relative training advantage is given in Table 13.  The 




A D O 
–1 24 50 178 
1 87 52 234 
TOTALS 111 102 412 
Table 13. The Distribution of the Relative Training  
Advantage Variable, “TRNGA” 
The attackers and the defenders had a relative training advantage 18 
percent of the time and 16 percent of the time, respectively.  Thus, 66 





























Figure 24. The Effect of Relative Training Advantage on Battle Outcome 
When they had the relative training advantage, attackers won 78 percent of 
the time and defenders won 49 percent of the time.  Compared to the 
initial distribution of battle outcomes, the attacker’s chance of winning 
increased 18 percent when it had a relative training advantage.  However, 
relative training advantage did not increase the defender’s chance of 
winning significantly. This may result from the historian’s inclination to 




f) Relative Morale Advantage: “MORALA” 
Morale is the greatest single factor in successful wars 
–Dwight D. Eisenhower 
The moral is to the physical as three is to one 
–Napoleon 
 
The distribution of relative morale advantage is given in Table 14.  The 
effect of relative morale advantage on the battle outcome is given in Figure 25. 
MORALA
WINA 
A D O 
–1 22 8 222 
1 110 2 261 
TOTALS 132 10 483 
Table 14. The Distribution of the Relative Morale  
Advantage Variable, “MORALA” 
The attacker had a relative morale advantage 21 percent of the time, and 
the defender only two percent of the time.  The defender’s low percentage 
of relative morale advantage may result from the specialty of defensive 
maneuvers or from the historians’ inclination toward assigning the relative 
advantage to the attacker’s side and the winner’s side.  Another 






























Figure 25. The Effect of Relative Morale Advantage on  
Battle Outcome  
When they had the relative morale advantage, attackers won 83 percent of 
the time and defenders won 80 percent of the time.  Compared to the 
initial distribution of the battle outcomes, the morale advantage increases 
the attacker’s and defender’s chance of winning by 23 percent and 40 
percent respectively.  We expect our classification models to include 
morale advantage. 
 
g) Relative Logistics Advantage: “LOGSA” 
Logistics cannot win a war, but its absence or inadequacy can 
cause defeat. 
– FM 100-5 Operations 
The distribution of relative logistics advantage is given in Table 15.  The 




A D O 
–1 6 16 230 
1 47 7 319 
TOTALS 53 23 549 
Table 15. The Distribution of the Relative Logistics  
Advantage Variable, “LOGSA” 
Attackers had the logistics advantage in eight percent of the battles, and 
defenders had this advantage in four percent of the battles. Generally (88 
percent) neither the attacker nor the defender had a relative logistics 
advantage.  This is not an intuitive distribution.  We would expect one side 





























Figure 26. The Effect of a Relative Logistics Advantage on Battle Outcome 
When they had a relative logistics advantage, attackers won 89 percent of 
the time and defenders won 70 percent of the time.  This is a high increase 
in the attacker’s and defender’s chance of winning compared to the initial 
distribution of the battle outcomes.  However, 88 percent of the time 
neither side had an advantage.  Thus, we would not expect this variable to 
be included in most of the models. 
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h) Relative Momentum Advantage: “MOMNTA” 
The energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum 
of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height.” 
– Sun-Tzu, The Art of War 
The distribution of relative momentum advantage is given in Table 16.  
The effect of relative momentum advantage over the battle outcome is given in Figure 27. 
MOMNTA
WINA 
A D O 
–1 31 3 218 
1 116 1 256 
TOTALS 147 4 474 
Table 16. The Distribution of the Relative Momentum  
Advantage, “MOMNTA”  
Attackers had the relative momentum advantage 24 percent of the time 
and defenders had this advantage 1 percent of the time.  The momentum 
advantage is related to force strength and movement.  The defender’s 






























Figure 27. The Effect of Relative Momentum Advantage  
on Battle Outcome 
When they had the relative momentum advantage, attackers won 79 
percent of the time and defenders won 75 percent of the time.  For the 
defenders’ side this is out of four observations, so this result is not 
significant.  The relative momentum advantage increased the attacker’s 
chance of winning by 19 percent compared to the initial distribution of the 
battle outcomes. 
 
i) Relative Intelligence Advantage: “INTELA” 
Intelligence is fundamental to effective planning, security and 
deception. 
– FM 100-5 Operations 
The distribution of relative intelligence advantage is given in Table 17.  




A D O 
–1 7 39 206 
1 73 8 292 
TOTALS 80 47 498 
Table 17. The Distribution of the Relative Intelligence  
Advantage Variable, “INTELA”  
Attackers and defenders had a relative intelligence advantage 13 percent 
and 8 percent of the time, respectively.  Neither side had the relative 
intelligence advantage 79 percent of the time.  This result shows that it has 





























Figure 28. The Effect of Relative Intelligence Advantage on Battle Outcome 
When they had a relative intelligence advantage, the attackers won 91 
percent of the time and the defenders won 83 percent of the time.  
Compared to the initial distribution of the battle outcomes, the intelligence 
advantage increased the attacker’s and the defender’s chance of winning 
by 31 percent and 43 percent respectively.  Thus, we expect that this 
variable will be present in the classification models. 
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j) Relative Technology Advantage: “TECHA” 
The distribution of relative technology advantage is given in Table 18.  
The effect of relative technology advantage over the battle outcome is given in Figure 29. 
TECHA
WINA 
A D O 
–1 8 5 239 
1 18 1 354 
TOTALS 26 6 593 
Table 18. The Distribution of Relative Technology  
Advantage Variable, “TECHA” 
Attackers had the relative technological advantage four percent of the time 
and defenders had this advantage one percent of the time.  In general, 
neither the attacker nor the defender had a significant technological 
advantage.  This result is not intuitive because we expect the attackers to 





























Figure 29. The Effect of Relative Technology Advantage  
on Battle Outcome 
When they had a relative technological advantage, the attackers won 69 
percent of the time and the defenders won 83 percent of the time.  Due to 
the low percentages of the attacker’s and the defender’s relative 
advantage, we do not expect this variable to be present in most of the 
classification models. 
 
k) Relative Initiative Advantage: “INITA” 
Initiative sets or changes the terms of battle by action and implies 
an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations 
-FM 100-5 Operations 
FM 100-5 Operations, the Army’s keystone doctrine, includes initiative as 
one of the tenets of army operations [Ref.13: p. 2-6].  The distribution of relative 
initiative advantage is given in Table 19.  The effect of relative initiative advantage on 




A D O 
–1 105 24 123 
1 311 0 62 
TOTALS 416 24 185 
Table 19. The Distribution of the Relative Initiative  
Advantage Variable, “INITA” 
Attackers had a relative initiative advantage 67 percent of the time and 
defenders had this advantage four percent of the time.  In 24 battles in 
which the defender had an initiative advantage and won the battle, other 
variables were also favoring the defender’s side. The defender had the 
leadership advantage in 19 of them; in the remaining five, neither side had 
the leadership advantage. In 14 of them, the defender had the intelligence 
advantage, while the attacker had the intelligence advantage only in one 
battle. In all battles, generally, the attacking side had the initiative 

































Figure 30. The Effect of Relative Initiative Advantage on the Battle Outcome 
When they had the relative initiative advantage, the attackers won 75 
percent of the time and the defenders won 100 percent of the time.  
Initiative advantage is one of the properties of offense.  The defender’s 
high success rate when they had the initiative advantage may reflect the 
battles in which the attacker’s offense was not effective. 
 
4. Terrain and Weather Descriptors 
a) Primary Local Terrain Description: “TERRA1” 
The primary local terrain description variable, “TERRA1,” consists of 
three characters, each describing a feature of the local terrain. However, TERRA1 has 17 
levels.  In order to decrease the number of levels, “TERRA1” was split into three 
variables with one element each and with names terra1.1, terra1.2, and terra1.3. 
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(1) First Character: “terra1.1” (Landscape Evenness) 
terra1.1 
WINA 
Flat (F) Rugged (G) Rolling (R) Other (O) 
−1 44 48 163 3 
1 69 83 235 3 
TOTALS 113 131 398 6 
Table 20. The First Terrain Descriptor 
The terrain was rolling 61 percent of the time, rugged 20 percent, and flat 
17 percent of the time.  Compared to the initial distribution of battle 
outcomes, “terra1.1” variable did not significantly change the attacker’s or 
defender’s chance of victory.  We do not expect this variable to be present 
in our classification models. 
 
(2) Second Character: “terra1.2” (Vegetation) 
terra1.2 
WINA 
Bare (B) Desert (D) Mixed (M) Wooded (W) Other(0)
−1 36 11 198 9 4 
1 40 22 299 23 6 
TOTALS 76 33 497 32 10 
Table 21. The Second Terrain Descriptor 
The terrain was mixed 75 percent of the time and bare 12 percent of the 
time.  Compared to the initial distribution of battle outcomes, the attacker 
had 0.12 higher chance of winning in wooded terrain, 0.06 higher chance 
in desert.  The defender had a 0.07 higher chance of winning in a bare 
terrain.  We would expect the defender to be more victorious in a wooded 
terrain and the attacker to be more victorious in a bare terrain.  As a 
conclusion, this variable did not change the attackers’ and defenders’ 
chance of winning significantly. 
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(3) Third Character: “terra1.3” (Composition) 
terra1.3 
WINA 
Other (0) Dunes (D) Marsh (M) Urban (U) 
−1 254 1 0 3 
1 385 1 1 3 
TOTALS 639 2 1 6 
Table 22. The Third Terrain Descriptor 
The third character was not available 99 percent of the time.  The battles 
fought in an urban environment are not significantly different from others, 
out of six battles the attacker and the defender won equally.  This variable 
is not expected to appear in the classification model. 
 
b) Primary Local Weather Descriptor: “WX1” 
The local weather descriptor, “WX1,” consists of five characters, each 
representing a characteristic of the weather.  In this state, “WX1” has 49 levels.  In order 
to decrease the number of levels,”WX1” will be split into five variables, each represented 
by one character. 
 
(1) First Character: “wx1.1” (Precipitation 1) 
wx1.1
WINA 
Dry (D) Wet (W) Other (0)
−1 194 65 1 
1 313 85 0 
TOTALS 507 150 1 
Table 23. The First Weather Descriptor 
The weather was dry 77 percent of the time and wet 23 percent of the 
time.  Compared to the initial distribution of battle outcomes, the attacker 
had a 0.01 higher chance of winning in dry weather, and the defender had 
a 0.03 higher chance of winning in wet weather.  This variable did not 
significantly increase the chances of winning, so we do not expect it to be 
present in our models. 
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−1 10 16 44 11 179 
1 25 33 51 30 259 
TOTALS 35 49 95 41 438 
Table 24. The Second Weather Descriptor 
The weather was sunny 66 percent of the time, light precipitation 14 
percent, and heavy precipitation 7 percent of the time.  Compared to the 
initial distribution of battle outcomes, the attacker had a 0.07 higher 
chance of winning under heavy precipitation, a 0.13 higher chance in 
overcast weather.  The defender had a 0.06 higher chance under light 
precipitation.   
 











−1 28 27 204 1 
1 41 62 295 0 
Size 69 89 499 1 
Table 25. The Third Weather Descriptor 
The weather was temperate 76 percent of the time, hot 14 percent of the 
time, and cold 10 percent of the time. Compared to the initial distribution 















−1 60 78 87 35 
1 67 131 149 51 
Size 127 209 236 86 
Table 26. The Fourth Weather Descriptor 
Battles were fought 36 percent of the time in summer, 32 percent in fall, 
19 percent in spring and 13 percent of the time in winter.  In general, the 
attacker chose to fight in summer and fall.  Compared to the initial 
distribution of battle outcomes, the attacker had a 0.07 higher chance of 
winning in spring.  We do not expect this variable to be present in our 
models. 
 









−1 4 1 255 
1 14 4 380 
Size 18 5 635 
Table 27. The Fifth Weather Descriptor 
Battles occurred one percent in tropical conditions, three percent in desert 
conditions, and others were in temperate conditions.  Compared to the 
initial distribution of battle outcomes, the attacker had a 0.17 higher 
chance in desert conditions; however, there are only 18 battles fought in 
this condition.  Therefore, this result is not significant.  We do not expect 
this variable to be present in our models. 
 
C. DISCUSSION 
This finishes the variables we will look at specifically.  Due to the nature of the 
combat and inaccessibility of historical records, many factors have missing values.  The 
missing values have a challenging affect on the modeling process.  The numbers of 
missing values of the data set and subsets are given in Table 28.   
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Many classification models just ignore every battle that has any missing value.  
However, in the CDB90 data set no battle has all of the variables we have described in 
this chapter.  Modeling with classification trees, using the rpart library of S-Plus, helps 
us to build models with the missing values.  This process uses surrogate splits when the 
model encounters a missing value.  The model has some disadvantages too.  The graph of 
the rpart only gives the regular splits, not the surrogate ones.  In order to understand an 
actual model, the long summary output should be used.   
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D. MISSING VALUES 























   WINA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   fR 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
   arty 153 39 17 79 19 48 34 5 2 146 7 
   tank 362 109 55 178 57 131 64 6 3 353 9 
   cav 514 34 21 116 82 36 46 150 73 291 223
   fly 484 109 55 178 81 131 68 76 17 391 93 
   CEA 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 20 0 33 
   LEADA 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 20 0 33 
   MORALA 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 20 0 33 
   INTELA 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 20 0 33 
   TECHA 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 20 0 33 
   TRNGA 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 20 0 33 
   LOGSA 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 20 0 33 
   SURPA 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 20 0 33 
   AEROA 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 20 0 33 
   PRIA1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 8 
   POST1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 
   terra1.1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 
   terra1.2 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 
   terra1.3 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 
   wx1.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   wx1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   wx1.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   wx1.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   wx1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 28. Missing Values in the Data Set and the Subsets 
Most of the calculated ratios have missing values that are assigned when 
the attacker or the defender did not have the specific kind of weapon or 
system.  The cavalry ratio has 78 percent missing values, the air sorties 
ratio has 74 percent, the tank ratio has 53 percent, and the artillery ratio 
has 23 percent missing values.  In the data set, none of the rows has all the 
ratio variables (force ratio, tank ratio, cavalry ratio, and air sorties ratio) 
present.  In other words, every row has at least one missing value.  This 
result shows the importance of using a classification model, such as 
classification trees with the rpart library, which can handle missing 
values without discarding the rows containing them.    
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E. CORRELATION BETWEEN VARIABLES 
 Most of our variables are factors.  In order to find correlation between them, the 
ordinal ones, variables that can be ordered, are converted to integer values.  In this case, 
level “A” is converted to “1,” “D” to “–1,” and “O” to “0.”  The cavalry ratio had no 
observations in common with tank and air sorties ratio and is not included.  The 








































































  WINA 1.00 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.32 0.52 0.26 0.33 0.07 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.21 0.45 0.22
  fR 0.13 1.00 0.18 0.53 0.41 −0.13 −0.14 0.22 0.06 0.00 −0.13 0.08 0.04 0.17 −0.02 0.11
  tank 0.11 0.18 1.00 0.21 0.50 0.04 −0.08 0.14 −0.03 0.33 0.02 −0.07 −0.05 0.14 −0.01 −0.15
  arty 0.10 0.53 0.21 1.00 0.31 0.02 −0.10 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.05
  fly 0.12 0.41 0.50 0.31 1.00 0.03 −0.04 0.06 −0.07 0.21 0.05 0.06 −0.13 0.28 −0.02 −0.09
  CEA 0.32 −0.13 0.04 0.02 0.03 1.00 0.54 0.10 0.06 0.18 0.68 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.28 0.14
  LEADA 0.52 −0.14 −0.08 −0.10 −0.04 0.54 1.00 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.39 0.08 0.21 0.11 0.40 0.11
  MORALA 0.26 0.22 0.14 0.17 0.06 0.10 0.06 1.00 0.09 0.15 −0.08 0.18 0.06 0.28 0.20 0.26
  INTELA 0.33 0.06 −0.03 0.04 −0.07 0.06 0.23 0.09 1.00 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.41 −0.04 0.29 0.10
  TECHA 0.07 0.00 0.33 0.09 0.21 0.18 0.06 0.15 0.06 1.00 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.18 0.12 0.12
  TRNGA 0.17 −0.13 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.68 0.39 −0.08 0.06 0.14 1.00 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.15 0.21
  LOGSA 0.21 0.08 −0.07 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.18 0.19 0.10 0.09 1.00 0.06 0.18 0.10 0.24
  SURPA 0.27 0.04 −0.05 0.01 −0.13 0.13 0.21 0.06 0.41 0.04 0.09 0.06 1.00 −0.04 0.28 −0.03
  AEROA 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.28 0.09 0.11 0.28 −0.04 0.18 0.02 0.18 −0.04 1.00 0.14 0.15
  INITA 0.45 −0.02 −0.01 0.00 −0.02 0.28 0.40 0.20 0.29 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.28 0.14 1.00 0.27
  MOMNTA 0.22 0.11 −0.15 0.05 −0.09 0.14 0.11 0.26 0.10 0.12 0.21 0.24 −0.03 0.15 0.27 1.00
Table 29. Correlation between Relative Variables 
a. The highest correlation is between relative combat effectiveness and 
training (0.68). 
b. The lowest negative correlation is between tank ratio and momentum 
advantage (−0.15).  This result is not intuitive.  However, when the 
tank ratio is available, 70 percent of the MORALA is coded as “O”, 
meaning neither side had the advantage or it is unknown.  
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c. Winning is highly correlated with relative leadership advantage and 
relative initiative advantage.  This variable is not highly correlated 
with weapon ratios, tank ratio, artillery ratio, CAS sorties ratio, and 
force ratio. No negative correlation exists between the “WINA” and 
other variables. 
d. Force ratio is negatively correlated with training, and combat 
effectiveness.  When they had training and combat effectiveness 
advantage, good leaders fought with fewer troops. Force ratio is highly 
correlated with the artillery ratio and the CAS sorties ratio.   
e. Tank ratio is highly correlated with the air sorties ratio, and technical 
advantage. 
f. The artillery ratio is correlated with the force ratio, tank ratio and air 
sorties ratio.  It is negatively correlated with leadership advantage. 
g. The CAS sorties ratio is correlated with force ratio, tank ratio, artillery 
ratio, technical advantage and air superiority, but the correlation is not 
very high.  This is not intuitive. 
h. The combat effectiveness advantage is correlated with training 
advantage, leadership advantage, and initiative advantage.  Good 
leaders had combat-effective troops who are well trained.  Initiative 
advantage is easier to gain with combat effective troops.  
i. The leadership advantage is correlated with combat effectiveness 
advantage and training advantage and initiative advantage. 
j. The morale advantage is positively correlated with the force ratio and 
momentum advantage and initiative advantage. 
k. The technical advantage is positively correlated with tank ratio, CAS 
sorties ratio and combat effectiveness. 
l. The training advantage is highly correlated with combat effectiveness. 
m. The logistics advantage is correlated with morale advantage, 
intelligence advantage, and momentum advantage. 
n. Surprise is correlated with intelligence advantage and initiative 
advantage. It is negatively correlated with the CAS sorties ratio. 
o. Air superiority is correlated with the CAS sorties ratio, force ratio, 
morale advantage, logistics advantage and technical advantage. 
p. The initiative advantage is highly correlated with winning, leadership, 
intelligence, surprise, combat effectiveness and momentum advantage. 
q. The momentum advantage is correlated with morale, training, and 
initiative. It is negatively correlated with tank ratio. 
 
F. SUMMARY OF THE VARIABLES 
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According to the descriptive statistics, some variables had more effect on the 
battle outcome than the others did.  These variables will most likely appear in the 
classification tree models.  However, we will provide all these variables as inputs to the 
model.  Then, the classification tree will select the variables that most affect the outcome 
of battles most greatly. The variables that are likely to appear in the classification model 
are 
Objective Variables:  
1. Air sorties ratio, “fly”  
2. Tank ratio, “tank” 
Relative Variables: 
 3. Surprise, “SURPA” 
 4. Leadership, “LEADA” 
 5. Intelligence, “INTELA.” 
 
G. NOTES ON THE DATA: 
1. In battles with ISEQNO 304 and 319, the attacker’s casualties are larger than their 
total personnel strength. The “fx” variable is assigned as “NA” to these two 
observations. 
2. In battles with ISEQNO 304, 319, and 334 the defender’s casualties are larger 
than their total force strength. The “fy” variable is assigned “NA” to these three 
observations. 
3. In battle with ISEQNO 22, the defender had one casualty while the attacker had 
3,000 casualties (44 percent of its force). The variables “fer,” ”fy,” “adv” is 
assigned “NA” for this observation. 
4. In row 652, the second and third character of TERRA1 should be switched.  
5. In the data, the second character of the terrain is about the cover status. “D” 
represents the Desert. In the weather data, the fourth letter represents the climate. 
“D” is for desert. However, in terrain there are 33 places with the character “D” as 
Desert conditions. In these 33 observations, only one of them, the weather, is 
represented as Desert. In all other 32 observations, while the terrain is Desert, the 
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weather appears to be temperate. This is inconsistent. On the other hand, the 
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III. CLASSIFICATION MODELS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, 
Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; 
fifthly, Victory. 
–Sun-Tzu, The Art of War 
In this chapter, classification tree models will be analyzed. The first set of models 
will be formed by using only the objective variables (MODEL 1). The second set of 
models will include objective and relative variables (MODEL 2). The third set of models 
will be built by using objective, relative, terrain, and weather variables (MODEL 3).  The 
pre-selected variables, which will be used in building classification trees, are listed 
below: 
Objective Variables: 
1. Force ratio, “fR” 
2. CAS sorties ratio, “fly” 
3. Tank ratio, “tank” 
4. Artillery ratio, “arty” 
5. Cavalry ratio, “cav” 
6. Attacker’s primary tactical scheme, “PRIA1” 
7. Defender’s primary defensive posture, “POST1” 
Relative Variables: 
8. Relative surprise, “SURPA” 
9. Relative air superiority in the theater, “AEROA” 
10. Relative combat effectiveness, “CEA” 
11. Relative leadership advantage, “LEADA” 
12. Relative training advantage, “TRNGA” 
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13. Relative morale advantage, “MORALA” 
14. Relative logistics advantage, “LOGSA” 
15. Relative momentum advantage, “MOMNTA” 
16. Relative intelligence advantage, “INTELA” 
17. Relative technology advantage, “TECHA” 
18. Relative initiative advantage, “INITA” 
Terrain and Weather Variables 
19. First terrain descriptor, “terra1.1” 
20. Second terrain descriptor, “terra1.2” 
21. Third terrain descriptor, “terra1.3” 
22. First weather descriptor, “wx1.1” 
23. Second weather descriptor, “wx1.2” 
24. Third weather descriptor, “wx1.3” 
25. Fourth weather descriptor, “wx1.4” 
26. Fifth weather descriptor, “wx1.5.” 
In the data set, there is a variable, “CRIT,” that shows how well the outcome of a 
battle is assigned. If the level of the variable is “1,” then the assignment is clear-cut. If it 
is “2,” then the assignment is not clear-cut. If it is “0,” then this variable is not available. 
There are 465 battles with clear-cut outcomes, 136 with outcomes that are not clear-cut, 
and 57 with an unknown criterion.  The sizes of the test sets with clear-cut outcomes are 
given in Table 30.  In some models and tables, test sets with only clear-cut outcomes will 
be referred as test.b. 
The validity of the models will be checked by predicting both the test sets, and the 
test sets with only clear-cut outcomes. 
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 Test1 Test2 Test3 Test4 Test5 
All outcomes 55 82 71 73 223 
Clear-cut outcomes 45 60 32 50 126 
Table 30. The Sizes of Test Sets, and Test Sets with  
Only Clear-Cut Outcomes 
 
B. BASE MODEL 
The distribution of the battle outcome variable, “WINA,” reveals that of the 658 
battles in the data set, the attacker was victorious 60 percent of the time.  Thus, a model 
assigning victory to the attacker can be considered as a base model.  The base model will 
correctly predict the outcome of the battles in the data set 60 percent of the time.  If a 
classification model cannot predict a battle outcome better than the base model, then that 
model is not informative.  Thus, we will compare the predictions of the classification 
models with the base model. 
Since the data set is split into five subsets, the correctness of the base model for 
each subset may differ from the others.  Table 31 shows the misclassification rate of the 
subsets, training sets, test sets, and the test sets with only clear-cut outcomes when 
predicted by using the base model. 
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Data MisclassificationRate 
Entire Data Set 0.40 
Train 1 0.35 






Test 1.B 0.38 
Train 2 0.52 






Test 2.B 0.27 
Train 3 0.37 






Test 3.B 0.16 
Train 4 0.35 






Test 4.B 0.32 
Train 5 0.43 






Test 5.B 0.25 
Table 31. The Misclassification Rates of the Data Set and Subsets  
When Predicted by the Base Model 
The base model predictions can be as high as 84 percent correct.  
However, as in predictions of training set two, it can be as low as 
48 percent.  Thus, the base model is not reliable.  Still, these 
misclassification rates may help us understand how good our 
models’ predictions are.  Note: “test n.b” refers to the test set “n” 
with only clear-cut outcomes. 
 
C. MODEL 1: FORCE RATIO, WEAPON RATIOS, POSTURE, AND TACTICS 
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In Model 1, we will build classification trees on training sets by using only the 
objective variables.  Battle simulations and war games mainly use objective variables in 
determining the outcome of engagements.  In this model, if we can achieve a high correct 
classification rate, we can conclude that objective variables are strongly related to the 
outcome of battles.  Otherwise, the objective variables alone will not be sufficient in 
predicting battle outcomes. 
In a model, six classification trees will be built, one for the entire data set and five 
for the subsets.  In order to understand the validity of the models, the classification trees 
built with training sets will be used in predicting both test sets and test sets with only 
clear-cut outcomes.  These predictions will reveal the quality of the model and its 
predictive power. 
1. Model 1.1: Entire Data Set (Yrs 1600-1982) 
The model built by using the entire data set (Figure 31) reveals that the most 
important objective factor is the CAS sorties ratio.  This model also correctly predicts the 
outcome of the Gulf War and the Kosovo War.  
In the data set, when neither side had CAS sorties, a missing value indicator is 
assigned to the CAS sorties ratio, “fly.”  There are 484 missing values for this variable. In 
the classification model, surrogate splits were used to classify the battles where the CAS 
sorties ratio was missing. (Here the surrogate split says: go to left branch if fR<0.4) 
2. Model 1.2: Subset 1 (Yrs. 1600-1847) 
The model for Subset 1 (Figure 32) shows that between years 1600 and 1799, the 
most important variable affecting the outcome of battles was cavalry. Here the training 
set included years 1600-1799 and the test set, years 1799-1847. 
3. Model 1.3: Subset 2 (Yrs. 1805-1918) 
The first split for the model of Subset 2 (Figure 33) is the force ratio. However, 
there are only nine battles for which the “fR” is greater than 4.9. The second split is 
cavalry, which is again revealed as the most important factor.  The training set included 
years 1805-1915 and the test set, years 1916-1918. 
4. Model 1.4: Subset 3 (Yrs. 1920-1945) 
The model for Subset 3 (Figure 34) reveals that the most important variable 
affecting the outcome of battles between years 1920 and 1944 is artillery.  The training 
set included years 1920-1944 and the test set, years 1944-1945. 
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5. Model 1.4: Subset 4 (Yrs. 1940-1982) 
The model for Subset 4 (Figure 35) reveals that the most important variable 
between years 1940 and 1948 is tank ratio. The second most important variable is 
artillery ratio. The training set included years 1940-1948 and the test set, years 1950-
1982. 
6. Model 1.6: Subset 5 (Yrs. 1600-1982) 
The model for Subset 5 (Figure 36) reveals that the most important variable 
affecting outcome of battles between years 1600-1944 is force ratio.  The training set 
included years 1600-1944 and the test set, years 1940-1982. 
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Figure 31. Model 1.1 for Entire Data Set 
Model 1.1 for the entire data set (658 battles from 1600 to 1982) reveals 
the CAS sorties ratio as the most important variable.  When the air sorties 
ratio is not available (in 484 battles), the split is done by a force ratio 
criterion (a surrogate split). If force ratio is less than 0.4, the battle 
outcome is classified as “defender wins,” otherwise “attacker wins.”  
However, this model can explain only 62 percent of the outcomes in 658 
battles.  Compared to the base model, this model makes only a 0.02 
improvement in the classification.  Therefore, the model is not useful. 
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Figure 32. Model 1.2 for Subset 1 
Model 1.2 can explain 69 percent of the battle outcomes in Training Set 1, 
which consists of 109 battles.  The base model can explain 65 percent of 
outcomes.  However, its predictions on Test Set 1 reveal a very high 
misclassification rate of 0.55, which is 0.10 worse than the base model 
prediction.  On the Test Set 1.b, the model prediction is 0.22 worse than 
the base model.  For this subset, the classification model is not 
informative, and it does not have predictive power.  The model reveals the 
cavalry ratio as the most important variable.  In Chapter II, our analyses 
show that the cavalry ratio is not expected to be a good predictor of battle 
outcomes.  The split of attacker’s primary tactics, “PRIA,” is interesting.  
After restricting the set of battles by cavalry ratio and force ratio, the 
model assigns the battle as win for the attacker when the tactic is single or 
double envelopment.  These are the preferred offensive tactics even today.   
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Figure 33. Model 1.3 for Subset 2 
Model 1.3 for Subset 2 can explain only 69 percent of the outcomes in the 
training set, which consists of 178 battles.  Predictions made by using this 
model on the Test Set 2 reveal a misclassification rate of 0.57, which is 
0.25 worse than the base model predictions.  On the Test Set 2.b, the 
predictions of the classification model are 0.31 worse than the base model 
predictions.  As a result, this model is not informative, and it does not 
have predictive power.  The first split criterion of the model is force ratio.  
However, there are only nine battles on that leaf (fR>4.9). In this training 
set, the attacker won all the battles when it had a force ratio of 4.9/1 and 
greater.  The second split criterion is cavalry ratio.  However, when the 
cavalry ratio is higher than 2.03, which means the attacker had over two 
times cavalry than the defender, the model assigned victory to the 
defender.  This anomaly is parallel to our findings in Chapter II. Note: The 
tree picture for this model does not contain the number of battles at the 
leaves, because the model has a high number of splits and the graph does 




Figure 34. Model 1.4 for Subset 3 
Model 1.4 can explain 69 percent of the battle outcomes in the Training 
Set 3, which consists of 131 battles.  Predictions made with this model on 
Test Set 3 reveal a misclassification rate of 0.34, which is 0.04 better than 
the base model predictions.  For Test Set 3.b, the difference between 
misclassification rates of the classification model and the base model is 
0.03.  We can conclude that the Model 1.4 has low prediction power.  The 
first split criterion is for the model is artillery ratio.  The second criterion 
is the attacker’s tactical scheme.  The model assigned attacker as “winner” 
when it used an offensive tactic other than the frontal attack. The third 




Figure 35. Model 1.5 for Subset 4  
The Model 1.5 can explain the outcome of 79 percent of the battles in 
Training Set 4, which consists of 150 battles.  Predictions of the model on 
Test Set 4 reveal a misclassification rate of 0.29, which is 0.01 better than 
the base model predictions.  For Test Set 4.b, the predictions of the 
classification model are 0.04 worse than the base model predictions.  We 
may conclude that the predictive power of this model is not good.  The 
first split criterion in the model is tank ratio.  The second is artillery ratio 




Figure 36. Model 1.6 for Subset 5 
The Model 1.6 can explain 62 percent of battle outcomes in Training Set 
5, which consists of 435 battles.  Predictions made by using this model on 
Test Set 5 reveal a misclassification rate of 0.42, which is 0.09 worse than 
the base model predictions. Regarding the predictions on the Test Set 5.b, 
the base model is 12 percent better than the classification model.  This 
model is not informative, and it does not have predictive power. 
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7. Conclusion 
Models built by using the objective values result in high misclassification rates 
(see Table 32). We can conclude that numbers alone are not reliable predictors of battle 
outcomes. This result may cast some suspicion on large-scale simulations, which cannot 




Rate of the Training 
Set 
Misclassification 
Rate of the Test Set
Misclassification 
Rate of the Test 




0.30 0.55 0.60 
Subset 2 
Yrs. 1805-1918 
0.31 0.57 0.58 
Subset 3 
Yrs. 1920-1945 
0.31 0.34 0.13 
Subset 4 
Yrs. 1940-1982 
0.21 0.29 0.36 
Subset 5 
Yrs. 1600-1982 
0.32 0.42 0.37 
Data set 
Yrs. 1600-1982 
0.38 NA NA 
Table 32. Misclassification Rates of the Models for Objective Variables  
The classification models resulted in high misclassification rates in test 
sets and the test sets only with clear-cut outcomes.  Since the models are 
built by using training sets, the high misclassification rates on the training 
sets suggest that the objective variables were insufficient to describe the 
outcome of battles.  The highest misclassification rate of this model is 60 
percent on Test Set 1.b.  The lowest is on Test Set 3.b.  The large 
differences between the misclassification rates show that some of the 
models are unreliable. 
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D. MODEL 2: OBJECTIVE AND RELATIVE VARIABLES 
Model 1, using only objective values, resulted in high misclassification rates on 
both the training set and the test set.  Objective variables are not reliable predictors of 
battle outcome.  In Chapter II, the correlation matrix reveals the same result, namely, low 
correlation rates with WINA and objective variables.  In Model 2, we are going to use 
both relative variables and objective variables.   
1. Model 2.1: Entire Data Set (Yrs. 1600-1982) 
The model for the entire data set, see Figure 37, reveals that the most important 
factor affecting the outcome of the battles throughout history is relative initiative 
advantage.  The other important variables are relative leadership advantage and force 
ratio. 
2. Model 2.2: Subset 1 (Yrs. 1600-1847) 
The model for Subset 1, see Figure 38, shows that the most important factor 
affecting the outcome of the battles was the relative leadership advantage. 
3. Model 2.3: Subset 2 (Yrs. 1805-1918) 
The model for Subset 2, see Figure 39, shows that the most important factor 
affecting the outcome of the battles is again the relative leadership advantage. 
4. Model 2.4: Subset 3 (Yrs. 1920-1945) 
The model for Subset 3, see Figure 40, reveals relative initiative advantage as the 
most important variable affecting the outcome of the battles. The other important 
variables are artillery ratio and combat effectiveness advantage. 
5. Model 2.5: Subset 4 (Yrs. 1940-1982) 
The model for Subset 4, see Figure 41, reveals that the most important variable 
affecting the outcome of the battles is relative initiative advantage.   
6. Model 2.6: Subset 5 (Yrs. 1600-1982) 
The model for Subset 5, see Figure 42, reveals that the most important variable 
affecting the outcome of the battles is relative leadership advantage.  The other important 
variables are relative initiative advantage and force ratio. 
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Figure 37. Model 2.1 for Entire Data Set 
Model 2.1 can explain the outcomes of 82 percent of the battles in the 
entire data set of 658 battles.  The first split criterion is relative initiative 





Figure 38. Model 2.2 for Subset 1 
Model 2.2 can explain 85 percent of the battle outcomes in Training Set 1. 
Predictions of this model on Test Set 1 reveal a misclassification rate of 
0.20, which is 0.25 better than the base model predictions. The prediction 
on Test Set 1.b is 0.22 better than the base model prediction.  Battles are 
classified only according to the relative leadership advantage.  The relative 
leadership advantage was more important than all other factors in 
determining the battle outcome between the years 1600-1799. 
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Figure 39. Model 2.3 for Subset 2 
Model 2.3 can explain 88 percent of the battle outcomes in Training Set 2.  
Predictions made with this model on Test Set 1 reveal a misclassification 
rate of 0.24, which is 0.08 better than the base model predictions.  
Predictions on the Test Set 2.b are 0.07 better than the base model 
predictions.  The most important variable is the relative leadership 
advantage.  Other decisive variables are morale advantage, force ratio and 
defender’s posture.  The low misclassification rates show that this model 
is useful and has predictive power. 
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Figure 40. Model 2.4 for Subset 3 
Model 2.4 can explain 83 percent of the battle outcomes in Training Set 3.  
Predictions of this model on Test Set 3 reveal a misclassification rate of 
0.30, which is 0.08 better than the base model predictions. Predictions on 
Test Set 3.b are 0.04 better. The most important variable is relative 
initiative advantage.  The other important variables are the artillery ratio 
and combat effectiveness advantage.  The low misclassification rates show 
that this model is useful and have predictive power. 
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Figure 41. Model 2.5 for Subset 4 
Model 2.5 can explain 71 percent of the battle outcomes in Training Set 4.  
Predictions of this model on Test Set 4 reveal a misclassification rate of 
0.34, which is 0.04 worse than the base model predictions.  Predictions on 
Test Set 4.b are 0.06 better than the base model predictions. The most 
important variable is relative initiative advantage.  The training set of 
Subset 4 mostly contains World War II battles, in which tanks and air 
power played a great role.  Intuitively, we would expect tank ratio and 
CAS sorties ratio to have importance in determining the battle outcome. 
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Figure 42. Model 2.6 for Subset 5 
Model 2.6 can explain 85 percent of the battle outcomes in Training Set 5.  
Predictions of this model on Test Set 5 reveal a misclassification rate of 
0.26, which is 0.17 better than the base model predictions.  Predictions on 
Test Set 5.b are 0.10 better.  The most important variable in the model is 
the relative leadership advantage.  Other variables only gain importance 
when neither side has the leadership advantage.  In that case, relative 
initiative advantage and force ratio gain importance. 
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7. Conclusion 
The models formed by using the objective variables and relative factors have 
better misclassification rates than the models with objective variables. The most 




Rate of the 
Training Set 
Misclassification 
Rate of the Test 
Set 
Misclassification 
Rate of the Test 




0.15 0.20 0.16 
Subset 2 
Yrs. 1805-1918 
0.12 0.24 0.20 
Subset 3 
Yrs. 1920-1945 
0.17 0.30 0.13 
Subset 4 
Yrs. 1940-1982 
0.29 0.34 0.26 
Subset 5 
Yrs. 1600-1982 
0.15 0.26 0.15 
Data Set 
Yrs. 1600-1982 
0.18 NA NA 
Table 33. Misclassification Rates of Model 2 Subsets 
The models can explain the battle outcomes in the training sets as high as 
88 percent.  Predictions on the test sets are better than the Model 1 
predictions.  Predictions on the Test Sets with Clear-cut Outcomes are 
even more accurate.  The worse prediction was 74 percent right, and the 
best prediction was 87 percent right.  This result may be close to the limit 
of what we can predict, when we consider the variability in the data set 




E. MODEL 3: OBJECTIVE AND RELATIVE VARIABLES; TERRAIN, AND 
WHETHER 
None of the models built with terrain and weather variables selected terrain and 
weather as predictor variables.  In addition, the misclassification rate of the models did 
not get better.  Thus, we can conclude that the weather conditions and terrain did not 
enable us to predict the battle outcomes more correctly.  Because of this, Classification 
trees for Model 3 are not included in the text. 
F. IMPORTANT VARIABLES AND MISCLASSIFICATION RATES OVER 
TIME 
1. Introduction 
In order to answer the question of “Can we predict the outcome of battles?” we 
built models using a set of earlier battles to predict the next one. The process works as 
follows: 
Take a number of battles as a training set, build a model, and predict the outcome 
of the next battle. Take the next training set and predict the battle after that. In other 
words, if we decide to make the training set size 100, then the first 100 battles will be 
used to build a model to predict the 101st battle. For the second prediction, take the 
second through 101st battles, build a model and predict the 102nd battle.  In this way, we 
are making (658 − training set size) predictions. We also record the correct and incorrect 
predictions, split criteria in each model, and the year of the test set.  In this way, we can 
see how models change over time. 
One of the challenges with this method is determining the size of the training set.  
Does the ability of past battles to predict the next one diminish with time?  In order to 
find the best size, we began using the model with different training set sizes. To predict 
the same battles, we always start predicting the 201st battle. The result shows that larger 
training sets usually have slightly better misclassification rates. 
Size 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 
Misclassification rate 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.38 
Table 34. Misclassification Rates versus Training Set Size 
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Classification trees, built by using a training set size of 125, give the lowest 
misclassification rate of 27 percent.  The resulting run produces 533 trees (658-125) and 
533 predictions.  Figure 43 shows the misclassification rates of the predictions.  The 
figure is formed by taking 30 predictions and calculating the misclassification rate, in a 
moving window method.  In order to show the trend in misclassifications, an overlap is 
made.  The first data point in Figure 43 shows the misclassification rate of first 30 
predictions.  The second point shows the misclassification rate of sixth through 35th 
predictions and so on. 

















Figure 43.  The Misclassification Rate 
The misclassification rates ranged from 0.1 to 0.53.  The first graph shows 
sharp increases and decreases in the misclassification rates.  The second 
graph reveals that the sharp increases happened in the mid-19th century 
and in two World Wars.  In the mid-19th century, gunpowder weapons 
were introduced, bringing about sharp increase lethality [Ref. 16:p.25].  In 
the two Word Wars, powerful new weapons, such as chemical weapons, 
tank and CAS are used.  Each classification tree is built by using the 
previous 125 battles.  These trees show the trend in the past battles simply 
and the prediction of the next battle is made by using this trend.  However, 
during periods of dramatic changes in weapons and tactics, the trend in 
past battles fails to predict the next (very different) battle.  When the trees 
are built by the data showing the changes, the models begin to make better 
predictions.  This result shows that data from earlier battles may have little 
value in understanding modern battles.  In order to use historical combat 
data effectively, we need more data from the latest battles. 
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2. Checking the Assumptions 
The 533 classification trees built with size 125 revealed an overall 
misclassification rate of 27 percent.  However, at the start we had made some 
assumptions.  In this section, the effects of these assumptions will be checked. 
First, at the beginning of our analyses, we had assumed draws as wins on the 
defender’s side.  In order to test this assumption, first, all draws are discarded from the 
data set. The resulting data set has 615 battles. The resulting models have a 25 percent 
misclassification rate.  This is slightly better than the previous model.  
Second, draws are assigned as wins to the attacker. The resulting models have a 
26 percent misclassification rate, which is no better than the previous ones.  
As a third model, the original battle outcome variable, “WINA” is used.  The 
original battle outcome variable has three levels, “1,” “0,” and “−1.”  The models using 
the original battle outcome variable revealed a 30 percent misclassification rate, which is 
worse than all the previous ones.   
A fourth model includes only the battles with clear-cut outcomes in training sets 
and test sets (data size=465).  The models revealed a 21 percent misclassification rate, 
which is the best rate of all.  In other words, classification models built on training sets 
with size 125 correctly predicted 79 percent of 340 battles (465−125=340).  
Fifth, some battles are fought with two million men, like the Moscow defense in 
WWII, and some fought with very small numbers, like the battles of Okinawa. In order to 
distinguish battles with a high number of participants from small battles with brigade size 
troops, a “divisive clustering” analysis is made.  Then, the data is assigned to three 
clusters with regard to year and total personnel strength on both sides.  The data in the 
largest cluster is used to build trees. The resulting models have a 28 percent 
misclassification rate. This is not a great difference. 
Sixth, another run is made by using only battles of World War II and after.  The 
resulting models have a misclassification rate of 0.28. 
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3. Relative Importance of Variables 
a) First-Split Criterion 
For a split criterion, a classification tree model chooses the variable that 
most affects the response variable.  If we look at the first split criteria in the models, we 
can comprehend the relative importance of the variables.  With a training set size of 125, 
533 classification trees are built.  Table 35 shows the percentages of variables that appear 
in the first split.  The relative initiative advantage appeared 40 percent of the time.  The 
relative leadership advantage appeared in the first split 38 percent of the time.  However, 
some of the variables, such as CAS sorties ratio and tank ratio were not available in 
battles throughout history.  Figure 44 gives a better picture of the first split criterion.  The 
relative leadership and initiative advantage appeared in the first split when more technical 
and powerful weapons, such as tanks and airplanes, were not available to fighters.   
As a result, we can say that the importance of factors affecting the battle 
outcome changed through history.  Relative factors yielded  to objective factors.   
Variable INITA LEADA fly arty tank MOMNTA fR TRNGA
Frequency 0.40 0.38 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Table 35. The First Split of the Classification Models 
The relative initiative advantage appeared in the first split 40 percent of 
the time.  Second, the relative leadership advantage appeared 38 percent of 
the time. 
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Figure 44. First-Split Criteria of Classification Models 
The relative leadership advantage appeared as the first-split criterion in the 
first battles of the data set.  The relative initiative advantage became 
important in World War I.  In World War II and after, objective variables, 
such as tank and CAS sorties ratio gained precedence over other variables. 
 
b) All-Splits Criterion 
The first-split criterion gives information, but some of the variables may 
appear on other splits.  To understand the overall importance of variables, all split criteria 
and their respective positions are recorded for the 533 classification trees.  On the other 
hand, the importance of the first split is somehow greater than the importance of the last 
split.  To account for this, a weighted sum is used.  However, finding optimal weights is 
another challenge, and it would be beyond the scope of the thesis--if they exist.  We give 
the weights intuitively, weighing the first split the most.  The first splits are much more 
important than the following splits.  They help classify a large portion of the data, while 
the later splits classify a small portion of data.  Because of this property, we gave higher 
weights to the first splits and lower weights to the later ones.  The chosen weights are 100 
for the first split, 50 for the second split, 25 for the third split, 12 for the fourth split, six 
for the fifth split, five for the sixth split, four for the seventh split, three for the eighth 
split, two for the ninth split, and one for the tenth split. 
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From the argument in the first-split criterion, we know that the importance 
of variables changed throughout history.  In order to understand the difference, two runs 
are made to build classification trees for battles before World War II and wars during and 
after World War II.  Table 36 shows the split criteria for battles before World War II, and 
their respective positions and Table 37 shows the split criteria for battles of Word War II 
and after. 
Position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
AEROA 0 0 6 9 0 0 1 0 0 0 
CEA 0 0 2 14 6 0 0 0 0 0 
INITA 56 6 17 15 6 0 0 0 0 0 
INTELA 0 0 0 2 2 3 0 1 0 0 
LEADA 204 35 5 2 0 6 0 1 1 0 
LOGSA 0 0 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MORALA 0 15 28 6 2 2 1 0 1 2 
POST1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
SURPA 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 1 0 0 
TRNGA 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
arty 0 0 3 8 1 0 0 2 0 0 
cav 0 0 0 2 1 0 4 0 0 0 
fR 0 58 22 15 10 1 0 1 3 0 
weights 100 50 25 12 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Table 36. The Split Criteria, the Respective Positions, 
 and Weights for Battles Before WWII 
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Position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
AEROA 12 0 0 4 2 6 6 2 3 3 1 0 0 
CEA 0 21 18 0 1 6 4 11 1 1 0 0 0 
INITA 4 19 9 12 2 4 8 3 1 1 0 0 0 
INTELA 0 35 14 5 14 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LEADA 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LOGSA 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MOMNTA 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
POST1 0 0 17 2 7 4 2 3 5 2 1 0 0 
PRIA1 0 0 0 9 2 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 
SURPA 0 10 4 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
TRNGA 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
arty 48 14 10 22 7 6 9 8 5 6 2 4 1 
fR 0 1 1 8 12 7 12 8 10 5 6 1 2 
fly 70 0 1 0 0 3 1 4 1 1 0 0 0 
tank 4 3 23 15 16 20 10 6 11 6 4 4 0 
Weights 100 50 25 12 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 
Table 37. Split Criteria, Respective Positions, and Weights for Battles  
of World War II and After 
As a second step, the number of appearances in the order of splits is 
multiplied by the weights.  In order to normalize the values, the resulting values are 
divided by the sum of all.  Figure 45 shows the normalized values for both the variables 






















































The Relative Importance of Variables in WWII and After
The Relative Importance of Variables before WWII
 
Figure 45. The Relative Importance of Variables 
Before World War II, the most important variables were the relative 
leadership advantage and the relative initiative advantage.  The force ratio 
was the third ranking variable.  However, in World War II, the dynamics 
of battle had changed.  After that, objective variables, such as CAS sorties 
ratio, artillery ratio, tank ratio became more important than the leadership 
advantage.  The importance of relative variables, such as combat 
effectiveness advantage and relative intelligence advantage increased 
during and after World War II.  
 
G. CONCLUSION 
Models using only objective variables resulted high misclassification rates.  
However, models using both objective and relative variables revealed low 
misclassification rates.  As a result, objective variables alone are not reliable predictors of 
battle outcomes. 
Moreover, the importance of variables affecting the battle outcome has also 
changed through history. The relative factors such as leadership and initiative advantage 
gave their importance to objective factors such as tank ratio and CAS sorties ratio.  
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In addition, the models show that data from earlier battles have a little value in 
understanding the modern battles.  In order to use historical combat data effectively, we 
need more data from the latest battles. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The analyses in the previous chapters reveal some important results.  In Chapter I, 
the literature about historical combat data analysis reveal that historical combat data 
analysis can help to understand different aspects of battles which cannot be well 
simulated. The descriptive statistics in Chapter II analyzes some of the variables that can 
affect the outcome of battles.  The descriptive statistics show that some variables had a 
higher correlation with the battle outcome than others.  The classification models in 
Chapter III reveal that the battle outcomes can be predicted by using classification tree 
models built by with historical combat data.  In this chapter, we will evaluate the validity 
of our findings and their prospective uses. 
The predictions of battle outcomes by using classification trees revealed as high 
as 79 percent correct (clear-cut outcomes).  This result is satisfying when the role of luck 
in battles and hard to quantify factors are considered.  The classification models also 
provided some information about the relative importance of variables in relation to the 
outcome of battles.  In addition, these models showed how this relationship changed 
throughout history. 
However, the validity of these results is directly related to the validity of the data 
set.  We have contacted Dr. Helmbold, who has supervised the CBD90G data set, about 
the validity and variability in the data set.  He pointed out that there were many 
uncertainties in the data set, and the models are affected by the diverse definitions and 
categories.  However, despite its shortcomings, it was the far and away the best available 
data base for statistical analyses.  Dr. Helmbold also pointed out that the models using 
this database should be confirmed by using independently compiled databases.   
About the relative variables we have used in building classification trees, Dr. 
Helmbold proposes two approaches.  One approach is to consider them as objective and 
reliable.  In this view, these variables can be used as predictor variables, as in Model 2.  
The second approach is to think that these variables are “not really very sound, but 
instead are ‘after the fact’ appraisals contaminated by already knowing the battle 
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outcome.”  In this approach, the results of Model 2 do not carry any importance.  He 
points out one way to solve this problem as making predictions before the prospective 
battles.  However, this approach has many challenges, such as assessing classified 
information. 
Descriptive statistics of the objective variables reveal that the battle outcome is 
not highly correlated with these variables.  The conditional plots of these variables show 
distributions that are similar when the attacker won and when it lost the battle.  Huge 
outliers in conditional graphs also show that some other important variables affected the 
outcome of a battle.  In addition, Model 1, which is built by using the objective variables 
alone, revealed high misclassification rates on predictions.  These results show that the 
objective variables alone are not sufficient to determine the outcome of a battle.  Thus the 
intangibles, relative factors, must have had a high effect. 
Our results are useful in providing some insights about battles.  There results are 
not precise because of the variability in the data and inclusion of relative factors.  
However, classification models provide information on how the importance of variables 
changed thorough history and which factors have most affected the battle outcome. 
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APPENDIX I.  DEFINITIONS 
For detailed descriptions, see [Ref.5: p.4-2]. 
Force Ratio (FR) is the ratio of the attacker’s number of personnel (X0) and the 
defenders number of personnel (Y0).  
FR = X0 / Y0          (4) 
Bitterness (EPS) and advantage (ADV) are derived from Lanchester Equations.  
EPS = SQR (FX * FY)        (5)  
where FX and FY are the attacker’s and the defender’s fractional losses.  
The attacker’s Fractional Loss (FX) is 
FX = CX / X0          (6) 
where CX is the attacker’s number of casualties.  
The defender’s Fractional Loss (FX) is  
FY = CY / Y0          (7) 
where CY is the defender’s number of casualties. 
The Casualty Exchange Ratio (CER) is the ratio of the attacker’s and the 
defender’s casualties.   
CER = CX / CY          (8) 
The Fractional Exchange Ratio is the ratio of the attacker’s and the defender’s 
fractional losses. FER = FX / FY. 
Advantage (ADV) is the defender’s empirical advantage parameter. 
 ADV = (1/2) * LOG (FER). 
Residual Advantage is “residual value of ADV after the average effects of any 
differences in FR values are removed.” [Ref.5: p. 4-11]  
RESAV = ADV – a – b * LOG (FR)        (9) 
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APPENDIX II.  MODEL OUTPUTS 
A. MODEL 1.1 
1) root 658 300 1 ( 0.4 0.6 )   
  2) fly<1.03759 45  20 -1 ( 0.6 0.4 ) * 
  3) fly>1.03759 613 200 1 ( 0.4 0.6 ) * 
Node number 1: 658 observations,    complexity param=0.05 
  predicted class= 1  expected loss= 0.4  
     class counts:  260 398  
    probabilities:  0.4 0.6  
  left son=2 (45 obs) right son=3 (613 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
      fly   < 1    to the left,  improve=10, (484 missing) 
      tank  < 3    to the left,  improve= 6, (362 missing) 
      fR    < 5    to the left,  improve= 6, (1 missing) 
      PRIA1 splits as  RRRLR, improve= 5, (8 missing) 
      arty  < 0.08 to the left,  improve= 3, (153 missing) 
  Surrogate splits: 
      fR   < 0.4  to the left,  agree=0.8, (483 split) 
      arty < 0.07 to the left,  agree=0.8, (0 split) 
 
Node number 2: 45 observations 
  predicted class= -1  expected loss= 0.4  
     class counts:  29 16  
    probabilities:  0.6 0.4  
 
Node number 3: 613 observations 
  predicted class= 1  expected loss= 0.4  
     class counts:  231 382  
    probabilities:  0.4 0.6 
 
B. MODEL 2.1 
1) root 658 300 1 ( 0.4  0.6  )   
   2) INITA:O,D 209  60 -1 ( 0.7  0.3  )   
     4) fR<3.67532 172  40 -1 ( 0.8  0.2  )   
       8) LEADA:O,D 150  20 -1 ( 0.8  0.2  ) * 
       9) LEADA:A 22   7 1 ( 0.3  0.7  ) * 
     5) fR>3.67532 37  10 1 ( 0.4  0.6  ) * 
   3) INITA:A 449 100 1 ( 0.3  0.7  )   
     6) LEADA:D 32   5 -1 ( 0.8  0.2  ) * 
     7) LEADA:O,A 417  90 1 ( 0.2  0.8  )   
      14) LEADA:O 255  70 1 ( 0.3  0.7  )   
        28) fR<1.08765 40  10 -1 ( 0.7  0.3  ) * 
        29) fR>1.08765 215  50 1 ( 0.2  0.8  ) * 
      15) LEADA:A 162  10 1 ( 0.07 0.9  ) * 
 
Node number 1: 658 observations,    complexity param=0.3 
  predicted class= 1  expected loss= 0.4  
     class counts:  260 398  
    probabilities:  0.4 0.6  
  left son=2 (209 obs) right son=3 (449 obs) 
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  Primary splits: 
      INITA  splits as  LRL, improve=60, (33 missing) 
      LEADA  splits as  RRL, improve=50, (33 missing) 
      CEA    splits as  LRL, improve=20, (33 missing) 
      MORALA splits as  LRL, improve=20, (33 missing) 
      INTELA splits as  RRL, improve=20, (33 missing) 
  Surrogate splits: 
      LEADA  splits as  RRL, agree=0.7, (0 split) 
      CEA    splits as  RRL, agree=0.7, (0 split) 
      INTELA splits as  RRL, agree=0.7, (0 split) 
      SURPA  splits as  RRL, agree=0.7, (0 split) 
      TECHA  splits as  RRL, agree=0.7, (0 split) 
 
Node number 2: 209 observations,    complexity param=0.03 
  predicted class= -1  expected loss= 0.3  
     class counts:  147  62  
    probabilities:  0.7 0.3  
  left son=4 (172 obs) right son=5 (37 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
      fR     < 4   to the left,  improve=9, (0 missing) 
      LEADA  splits as  LRL, improve=8, (0 missing) 
      arty   < 10  to the left,  improve=7, (54 missing) 
      fly    < 1   to the left,  improve=7, (149 missing) 
      INTELA splits as  LRL, improve=5, (0 missing) 
  Surrogate splits: 
      TECHA splits as  LLR, agree=0.8, (0 split) 
 
Node number 3: 449 observations,    complexity param=0.08 
  predicted class= 1  expected loss= 0.3  
     class counts:  113 336  
    probabilities:  0.3 0.7  
  left son=6 (32 obs) right son=7 (417 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
      LEADA  splits as  RRL, improve=20, (33 missing) 
      CEA    splits as  LRL, improve= 9, (33 missing) 
      MORALA splits as  LRL, improve= 7, (33 missing) 
      AEROA  splits as  RRL, improve= 7, (33 missing) 
      INTELA splits as  LRL, improve= 7, (33 missing) 
 
Node number 4: 172 observations,    complexity param=0.03 
  predicted class= -1  expected loss= 0.2  
     class counts:  133  39  
    probabilities:  0.8 0.2  
  left son=8 (150 obs) right son=9 (22 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
      LEADA  splits as  LRL, improve=10, (0 missing) 
      CEA    splits as  LRL, improve= 5, (0 missing) 
      INTELA splits as  LRL, improve= 4, (0 missing) 
      TRNGA  splits as  LRL, improve= 4, (0 missing) 
      INITA  splits as  R-L, improve= 2, (0 missing) 
  Surrogate splits: 
      fR     < 0.5 to the right, agree=0.9, (0 split) 
      MOMNTA splits as  LLR, agree=0.9, (0 split) 
 
Node number 5: 37 observations 
  predicted class= 1  expected loss= 0.4  
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     class counts:  14 23  
    probabilities:  0.4 0.6  
 
Node number 6: 32 observations 
  predicted class= -1  expected loss= 0.2  
     class counts:  27  5  
    probabilities:  0.8 0.2  
 
Node number 7: 417 observations,    complexity param=0.03 
  predicted class= 1  expected loss= 0.2  
     class counts:   86 331  
    probabilities:  0.2 0.8  
  left son=14 (255 obs) right son=15 (162 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
      LEADA  splits as  LR-, improve=10, (33 missing) 
      AEROA  splits as  RRL, improve= 7, (33 missing) 
      CEA    splits as  LRL, improve= 4, (33 missing) 
      INTELA splits as  LRL, improve= 4, (33 missing) 
      tank   < 3   to the left,  improve= 4, (202 missing) 
  Surrogate splits: 
      CEA   splits as  LRL, agree=0.8, (0 split) 
      fR    < 1   to the right, agree=0.7, (32 split) 
      TRNGA splits as  LRL, agree=0.7, (0 split) 
      AEROA splits as  RLL, agree=0.7, (0 split) 
      PRIA1 splits as  RRRLL, agree=0.7, (1 split) 
 
Node number 8: 150 observations 
  predicted class= -1  expected loss= 0.2  
     class counts:  126  24  
    probabilities:  0.8 0.2  
 
Node number 9: 22 observations 
  predicted class= 1  expected loss= 0.3  
     class counts:   7 15  
    probabilities:  0.3 0.7  
 
Node number 14: 255 observations,    complexity param=0.03 
  predicted class= 1  expected loss= 0.3  
     class counts:   74 181  
    probabilities:  0.3 0.7  
  left son=28 (40 obs) right son=29 (215 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
      fR     < 1   to the left,  improve=20, (1 missing) 
      arty   < 1   to the left,  improve= 8, (49 missing) 
      MORALA splits as  LRL, improve= 8, (16 missing) 
      tank   < 4   to the left,  improve= 5, (98 missing) 
      LOGSA  splits as  LRL, improve= 4, (16 missing) 
 
Node number 15: 162 observations 
  predicted class= 1  expected loss= 0.07  
     class counts:   12 150  
    probabilities:  0.1 0.9  
 
Node number 28: 40 observations 
  predicted class= -1  expected loss= 0.3  
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     class counts:  28 12  
    probabilities:  0.7 0.3  
 
Node number 29: 215 observations 
  predicted class= 1  expected loss= 0.2  
     class counts:   46 169  
    probabilities:  0.2 0.8 
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